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Introduction 
One contribution  that the recent literature on “rational expectations” 
in macroeconomic  models’  has  to make to the  older literature  on the 
neutrality of  money is to suggest a definition of  the real interest rate in a 
stochastic environment and to suggest senses in which it may or may not 
be controllable by the monetary authority  (or “Fed”). The new defini- 
tion  takes the “rationally  expected real  rate of  interest”  as the nominal 
or “money” interest  rate  (as quoted in financial markets or perhaps  as 
an after-tax  interest rate) minus the optimally forecasted inflation  rate. 
The senses in which  it may or may not be  controlled  are described in 
terms  of  the nature  of  the  influence  of  chosen  parameters  of  the Fed 
policy rule on the stochastic properties  (and relation to other variables) 
of  the real rate so defined. 
There are at least three distinct hypotheses  concerning  the Fed’s  in- 
fluence over rationally expected real  interest rates that seem to be sug- 
gested  in  recent  discussions of  monetary  policy.  We will  give  a brief 
statement of  them here subject to clarification below.  We will disregard 
at this point  whether  we  wish  to use  an  “after-tax  real  rate.”  It is as- 
sumed  throughout  that Fed policy takes the form only of  open market 
operations  and  that  the  interest  rate  is  a  short-term  one.  In order  of 
decreasing stringency and testability, these nested hypotheses are: 
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Hypothesis I.  The form the Fed policy rule takes, whether determin- 
istic  or random,  has no  effect  on the  behavior  of  rationally  expected 
real interest rates. That is, the Fed has no ability to shock rationally ex- 
pected real interest rates at all in the short run or long run. This hypothe- 
sis has apparently never been asserted outright in the published literature 
but does seem implicit in many discussions. The hypothesis seems to be 
suggested by those who would  try to explain interest  rates in terms of 
inflationary expectations without  apparent regard  to the form monetary 
policy  has taken.  Fama, in  his well-known  article  on interest  rates as 
predictors  of  inflation  (1975), seems to suggest this hypothesis  when 
he extends his own hypothesis that one-month real rates are constant to 
periods when the Fed apparently caused a credit crunch, but at another 
point he also appears to deny explicitly that the Fed has no influence at 
all over real interest rates.* 
Hypothesis 2.  The Fed  can  shock  rationally  expected  real  interest 
rates, but only by taking policy actions other than the actions the public 
supposes they are taking. That  is,  if  Fed policy on a particular day is 
known by the public on that day, it will have no effect on real rates. 
Hypothesis 2  has some important implications. First, it implies that 
the Fed’s ability to affect real interest rates relies essentially on secrecy. 
If  the Fed  opened up  all  of  its  internal  discussion  to public  scrutiny 
without  time lag,  it  would  then  lose  any  ability to affect real  interest 
rates.  Second, the hypothesis  implies that even if  the Fed is allowed to 
maintain secrecy, then still the systematic  (i.e., nonrandom)  part of  its 
policy rule is  without  effect  on real  interest  rates.  That is,  if  the Fed 
attempts  consistently  to  pursue  any  “sensible”  or “purposeful”  policy 
then  its policy behavior  will bear  some consistent  relation to business 
conditions and will become predictable by economic agents outside the 
Fed. This assumes that the Fed has no secrets about business conditions, 
that is, does not have any “information advantage” over the public. 
Hypothesis  2 would appear to be suggested by many models that in- 
corporate the Lucas-Sargent-Wallace  aggregate supply relation  (see, for 
example, Lucas 1973 ), or variations on it, and is specifically an implica- 
tion of  the macroeconomic model of  Sargent and Wallace (1975). 
Hypothesis 3. Any  policy  action  by  the Fed that is  known  by  the 
public sufficiently far in advance will have no effect on rationally expected 
real  interest  rates.  That  is,  we  could  in  principle  identify  a  “policy 
effectiveness interval,” which might be as short as a few days or as long 
as many years. If the Fed policy rule depends only on information known 
2. Data before  1951 is not usable, Fama (1975) said, because “in effect a rich 
and obstinate investor  (Le., the Fed) saw to it that Treasury bill rates did not ad- 
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earlier by this time interval,  then the form the rule takes will have no 
effect on the behavior of  real interest rates. 
The implications of  hypothesis  3  depend on the length of  the policy 
effectiveness interval. If  the interval is years long, then the Fed may have 
substantial scope for systematic countercyclical  monetary policy.  Since 
the business “cycle” is not rigidly periodic, it cannot be forecasted years 
in  advance, and so even  if  the Fed policy rule follows a consistent  or 
systematic relation to business conditions, the public will still not have 
enough advance notice of  the policy to react in such a way that real rates 
become uncontrollable. But if  the interval is very short, then there may 
not be an important  difference between hypothesis  3  and hypothesis 2. 
We will speak of  this hypothesis as implying generally a policy effective- 
ness interval of, say, at least a number of  months, but less than a number 
of  years. 
Hypothesis  3 seems to be suggested in many discussions. It is specifi- 
cally a consequence of  a model by Phelps and Taylor (1977) and would 
appear to be  implied  (though  not explicitly in his  model)  by Fischer 
(1977). These models connected  the policy  effectiveness interval with 
the length of  time prices are rigid  (Phelps and Taylor) or the length of 
time labor contracts run (Fischer)  .3 
All of our hypotheses are meant to characterize economies in “expecta- 
tions  equilibria,”  and  in  the  literature  that  suggested them,  “rational 
expectations equilibria.” By an expectations equilibrium we mean merely 
a situation in which economic agents have unchanging subjective proba- 
bility  distributions for  all  stochastic variables  in the  economy.  If  this 
equilibrium  is  rational,  these  subjective  distributions  are  correct.  In 
such an equilibrium, then, economic agents have a correct understand- 
ing, to the extent that it will ever be understandable,  of  the Fed policy 
rule.  What  economic  agents  do  not  understand  is  represented  as  a 
stochastic term with known properties. Our hypotheses 2 and 3 concern 
comparative  expectations  equilibria,  that  is,  what  changes  in  the be- 
havior of  economic variables will occur when the parameters of  the policy 
rule are changed after the public fully appreciates the systematic nature 
of  the  change.  In understanding  hypotheses  2  or  3, it is  particularly 
important to bear this in mind. If  the Fed changes its policy rule  (e.g., 
changes  the way  the money  growth  rate responds  to unemployment), 
then  there  will no doubt be  a transition  period  before  a new  rational 
3.  In Phelps and Taylor 1977, prices are assumed to be fixed by firms one period 
in  advance  and  the  money  supply  fixed  by  the  Fed  based  on  information  not 
known one period in  advance. If  Fed policy were  known  one period in  advance, 
then  taking expectations  of  their expression  (8) based  on information  known  at 
time t-1  and using their expression (6),  one finds that the money stock drops out 
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expectations equilibrium is rea~hed.~  The length of  this transition period 
is not to be confused with the policy effectiveness interval. 
These hypotheses would seem in principle to be subject to some form 
of empirical verification.  The concepts of  a “rationally  expected real in- 
terest rate” and of  a “Federal Reserve policy rule” and changes thereof 
are sufficiently slippery, however, to make it difficult to bring empirical 
evidence to bear on any of  these hypotheses,  as we shall discuss in the 
next section of  this paper. It is perhaps for this reason that the literature 
relating to these hypotheses is almost exclusively theoretical.  Empirical 
literature on the real interest rate (e.g., the Fama 1975 article mentioned 
above), while  perhaps  relevant  to our evaluation  of  these hypotheses, 
does not explicitly consider them. 
At the same time, there are some who have asserted, on the basis of 
their observations of  real world phenomena, that certain of  these hypothe- 
ses are highly “implausible.” It is apparently a useful exercise, therefore, 
to  discuss  ways  in  which  empirical  evidence  (qualitative  as  well  as 
quantitative)  might be brought to bear on them, if  at all. 
Our purpose in this paper is (a)  to discuss the definitions of “rationally 
expected real  interest rates”  and  “Fed policy rule”  and the meaning of 
the three  hypotheses  described  above,  (b)  to discuss  the kind  of  sub- 
jective  beliefs  that  must  be  added  before  these  hypotheses  have  any 
testable implications, and  (c) to look at the data and  empirical litera- 
ture in monetary  economics to see if  there are any clues to the plausi- 
bility of  the hypotheses when they are given “reasonable” interpretations. 
Some will perhaps  argue that the  abstract models that yielded  these 
hypotheses  are  not  to  be  taken  literally,  that  they  are  intended  as 
abstract possibilities  that suggest a change in our methods  of  monetary 
policy evaluation. Nonetheless, people have applied them to discussions 
of  historical  experience  and  will no doubt  be inclined  to do so in the 
future. We think, then, that it is not premature to discuss whether these 
hypotheses might be considered useful in understanding historical experi- 
ence. Needless to say, our examination of  these hypotheses should not be 
interpreted  as an  evaluation  of  the  contribution  to the history  of  eco- 
nomic thought of  the abstract models that gave rise to them. 
Definition and Measurement of  Real Interest Rates and Fed Policy Rule 
The Real Rate of  Interest 
A number of  different definitions have been applied to the term “real 
interest  rate.”  For simplicity,  we will  at this  point  disregard  tax  con- 
siderations in defining them. 
4.  The economy may never  reach  a new  rational  expectations  equilibrium,  or 
may never be in one. These are important  theoretical possibilities  that lessen  the 
appeal of  models that assume rational expectations equilibria (see Shiller  1978). 121  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
First, the m-period  real interest rate at time t has been defined as the 
money  or “nominal”  interest  rate  (the usual  rate quoted  at time  t  in 
financial markets)  minus  the  actual inflation rate from  time  t to time 
t +  m.5  Since  the inflation  rate is  not  known  with  certainty,  the real 
interest rate by this definition is not known at time t, and hence we will 
refer to this as the ex post real interest rate. By this definition  the real 
interest rate is readily measured ex post, at least insofar as inflation can 
be measured. 
Second, the m-period  real interest rate at time t has been defined as 
the nominal  interest  rate minus  the average  inflation  rate forecast  by 
professional forecasters as quoted in the news media. Readers of  business 
periodicals  are regularly  supplied with  inflation  forecasts by  the major 
consulting firms that specialize in macroeconomic forecasting. It has been 
argued that, realistically, no one in the public has any significant informa- 
tion advantage over these professional forecasters and that it would seem 
rational to base decision making on these forecasts. These consensus fore- 
casts, while not  market  determined,  are the result of  intense discussion 
in  a sort of  intellectual “marketplace,” especially in more recent years. 
We  will  call  this  the  consensus  real  interest  rate.  The consensus real 
interest rate is readily measured with a slight lag, which is a publication 
lag. Since  inflation  forecasts  usually  move  slowly,  this  lag  is generally 
not important, but is potentially important in some hypothetical circum- 
stances. 
Third, the m-period  real interest rate at time t has been defined as the 
rate  quoted  at time  t  on an m-period  index  bond.  An m-period  index 
bond is a bond whose coupons or principal due at maturity at time t +  m 
are guaranteed in real terms, that is, they are escalated by a price index. 
We  will call this the  market real  interest rate. The market  real  interest 
rate is readily measurable at time t, since it is a rate quoted on financial 
markets. Unfortunately,  a market €or such index bonds does not yet exist 
in the United States. 
We will digress for a moment to consider whether the Fed might con- 
trol the real  interest  rate  by  any of  these  definitions.  The ex post  real 
rate is obviously  not fully  controllable,  since  inflation  cannot be fully 
forecasted, Clearly, however,  the Fed can  always control the consensus 
real  interest rate as it desires  (so long, at least, as this is consistent with 
a positive  nominal  rate)  if  it is willing to accept  the economic conse- 
quences of  the control. The Fed can choose a real interest rate, add to 
that the latest consensus inflation forecast, and then “peg”  the nominal 
rate  at their  sum. If  we  abstract  from  current institutional  details, the 
5. Slight variations in the definition arise because of  different ways of  handling 
compounding. For example, we might define the real interest rate as one plus the 
nominal rate divided by one plus the rate of  inflation. We  disregard the differences 
among these  definitions in  what  follows. 122  Robert J. Shiller 
owner of  the  “printing press”  could  announce that it stands ready  to 
borrow  and lend unlimited  amounts at this nominal rate,  and then no 
one would borrow from another person at a higher rate nor would one 
lend to another at a lower rate.  If  the Fed can print nominal bonds  as 
well as money in unlimited amounts, there is no limit to its ability to do 
this  (or to repay the principal on the nominal bonds when they come 
due). One might question, however, whether it is really of  interest that 
the Fed can do this. If  the Fed, in its control of  consensus real interest 
rates, were  to cause rapid  economic  changes,  then the publication  lag 
might make the consensus forecast unimportant  to economic decisions. 
Should  markets not  all clear, the inflation rate based on  quoted prices 
might become less relevant to economic decision making. A hyperinfla- 
tion might ensue if  the Fed tried to peg rates too low or if  it consistently 
followed certain policy rules which would ultimately cause money to be 
abandoned  as the medium of  exchange. A deflation might ensue if  the 
Fed tried  to peg rates too high; this might  cause nominal rates to hit 
zero, ending the Fed’s latitude for control. 
It would  seem highly plausible  a priori that at any moment of time 
there is nonzero range over which the Fed can influence consensus real 
interest  rates.  Efforts  to peg such real interest rates do not  create un- 
limited riskless profit opportunities. In contrast, suppose (to take a sim- 
ple extreme example) the Fed tried to establish different borrowing and 
lending (nominal)  rates and offered to lend, say, at 3% and borrow at 
an incrementally higher rate. It would thereby create an unlimited risk- 
less profit opportunity. Individuals would borrow from the Fed and use 
the proceeds to lend to the Fed and would reap a profit with certainty. 
It is realistic to suppose that if  the Fed really  announced this, however 
small  the  increment,  it  would  quickly  find  an infinite  supply  of  both 
lenders and borrowers. If, however, the Fed announced a reduction of 
the consensus real interest  rate from 2%, say, to 1 % , it seems hard to 
imagine that anything really  dramatic would happen and historical ex- 
perience appears to confirm this. The question, then, is how far and for 
how long it can reduce or raise the consensus real interest rate. 
The Fed would seem to have the same sort of  potential control over 
market  real  interest  rates  with  one modification.  It could  announce  a 
market real interest rate and offer to buy unlimited  quantities of  index 
bonds at this rate, but it cannot sell unlimited quantities of  index bonds. 
While it  can  promise  to deliver  unlimited  quantities  of  money  in the 
future, it cannot promise to deliver unlimited quantities of  real goods in 
the future. There are limits  to the Fed’s  ability  to command  real  re- 
sources through inflationary finance. Hence it would seem that the Fed 
could  depress  market  real  interest  rates  as it  pleases,  but  there  are 
limits to its ability to elevate them. A hyperinflation is, of  course, a possi- 123  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
ble consequence of depressing the market real interest  rates too far or 
for too long. 
The rn-period rationally expected real interest rate at time t, which is 
defined as the rn-period nominal rate quoted at time t minus the optimal 
forecast of the inflation between time t and time t +  m,  is not so readily 
observed either ex ante or ex post.  The rationally expected real rate of 
interest is not necessarily equal to the consensus real rate of  interest or 
market real rate of  interest. In fact, the rationally expected real rate of 
interest  is undefined unless  economic variables are stochastic processes 
whose random properties are given. Such a definition thus makes sense 
only  when  the  Fed’s  behavior  itself  can be described  as a  stochastic 
process or policy rule related to other economic variables. The question 
then  is, can the Fed, in  deciding  on  its policy rule,  choose a  rational 
expectations  equilibrium  characterized  by  a  desired  behavior  of  the 
rationally expected real interest rate? 
Such a definition of the real  rate of interest is inherently academic, 
and at the same time a rather elusive concept. It is academic because in 
a world that is enormously complex and constantly changing, there is no 
way  to define an optimal forecast without some assertion  of  faith in a 
model of  some sort. Economic agents clearly have diverse models and 
forecasts.  We  can  estimate empirical forecasting  equations,  but  these 
will differ depending on the structure we  assume, the explanatory vari- 
ables we include, and the sample period we choose. The concept is also 
elusive when applied to the present issue for a couple of  reasons. First, 
monetary authorities do not think of  themselves as outcomes of  stochastic 
processes and tend to think of  themselves as exercising free will. If  they 
must be described in terms of  a reaction function, it would be logical to 
ask whether  they can  even choose parameters of  this function. Second, 
it is no longer possible to speak of  the Fed as defining its policy rule as 
a function of  an observed  real  interest rate or observed  expected  rate 
of  inflation, since these depend on the policy rule. That is, the Fed can- 
not  announce that it will buy  and sell bonds at 2% plus the optimally 
forecasted rate of  inflation, since it does not know what this will become 
upon announcement. A rational expectations theorist might be able, given 
a complete model of  the economy, to find an “inflationary expectation” 
as a function of  observable variables predetermined at time t, so that if 
the Fed pegs nominal rates at the desired real rate plus this inflationary 
expectation, then this inflationary  expectation will be an optimal fore- 
cast of  the resulting  inflation.  But  it is not  obvious that we know the 
model that might enable rational expectations theorists to do this. It is 
also conceivable that no such rational expectations equilibrium at the de- 
sired real rate of  interest exists or that, even if  it might exist, there may 
be  no  path  of  economic variables  that  makes  a  transition  from  the 124  Robert J. Shiller 
present equilibrium to the alternative equilibrium. It may be, for example, 
that an announced policy of  pegging the real yield of  an index bond may 
not cause the economy to converge on a rational expectations equilibrium 
at all, because the price level may explode to infinity. 
In this sense, then, models in which the indefinite fixing of  market real 
yields  at some  announced  function of  state variables will  result in un- 
stable price behavior might be described  as models in which the ration- 
ally expected real rate is absolutely uncontrollable. 
Given  the  difficulties with  the concept  of  a  rationally  expected real 
rate of  interest, a practical control theorist  might conclude that there is 
no point even in considering the concept. One might wish to define the 
structure of  the economy in terms of  observable variables. Yet it may be, 
as rational expectations theorists have argued, that the true structure of 
the economy  is  not  comprehensible unless  such variables  are included 
in our model. 
Tax Law and the Definitions of the Real Interest Rate 
For  an  individual  or corporation  in  marginal  income  or  corporate 
profits tax  bracket  T  the  after-tax  ex  post  real  rate of  interest  is found 
by  subtracting  the inflation  rate from  (1 -  T) times the nominal  rate. 
This is the rate of  increase in real after-tax buying power. Definitions of 
consensus real rates  and rationally  expected real  rates may also be put 
on  after-tax  basis  by  replacing  the  nominal  rate  in  the definition  by 
(1 -  7)  times the nominal rate. Now, we have not a single after-tax real 
interest rate but an array of  such rates, one for each tax bracket. 
It has been  suggested  (Darby 1975, Feldstein  1976) that hypotheses 
such as ours should refer not to the simple real interest  rate but to the 
after-tax real rate for some “representative”  tax bracket or for the cor- 
porate tax  rate paid  by  large  corporations.  There is a  sort of  intuitive 
plausibility  to this suggestion.  Consider two individuals in the same tax 
bracket  who wish  to  make  a  three-month  loan  between  them.  No net 
taxes are paid by the two of  them considered together since the borrower 
deducts  interest  paid  equal to the amount  declared  as  income  by  the 
lender. In effect, the government refunds  T times the interest  rate from 
the lender  to the  borrower.  In the  face of  inflation,  if  the  individuals 
wish to keep the amount of  real resources transferred  in the terms of  the 
loan the same as without inflation, they need only mark up their nomi- 
nal rate by the inflation rate times  I/  (1 -  7). 
If  our tax system were  neutral to inflation  in other ways,  and if  all 
individuals  paid  the  same marginal tax rate, then  it  would  seem  quite 
plausible  that  our hypotheses  should  refer  to  the  after-tax  real  rate. 
The problem is that our tax system is not neutral in other ways to infla- 
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purchase  physical assets for speculative  purposes,  then  he  will not be 
happy  with  an arrangement  that  keeps  his  real  after-tax  interest paid 
constant in the face of  inflation, since he will be taxed on the inflation 
of  the price of  his investment. Indeed, with such short-term speculation 
for which gains are taxed as ordinary income, his profits after tax will 
remain constant in the face of  inflation only if  the simple (not after-tax) 
real  rate  is  kept  constant.  The lender  may  then also be indifferent to 
either making the loan or investing in the physical asset himself. But if 
the borrower wishes to spend the money on a vacation  (and the lender 
views the opportunity cost of  the loan as a vacation foregone), then he 
may be happy with the constant after-tax  real rate, precisely since he is 
not taxed on the “psychic” income from an investment in a vacation and 
hence inflation does not affect him in the same way. It is clear, then, that 
inflation affects taxes of  individuals in different circumstances  in differ- 
ent ways, and so it is not likely that hypotheses  1 through 3 above could 
be  given a simple rationale in  terms of  any particular definition of  the 
real interest rate. 
One possible conclusion of  our consideration of  tax effects is that our 
empirical work should concentrate on the period before World War 11, 
when  income taxes were relatively negligible. Postwar monetary policy 
is not really “pure” monetary policy since it affects real taxes. If  we are 
interested in the ability of  “pure” monetary policy to affect real interest 
rates,  then we  had best confine our  attention to the period when  such 
policy  was  practiced.  Our approach  here  is  instead  to  consider  both 
periods  in  terms  of  the  simple real  interest  rate  even  though  for the 
postwar period the hypotheses may be of  less interest. 
The Federal Reserve Policy Rule and Hypothesis Testing 
We will suppose first that all relevant possible Federal Reserve policy 
rules can be summarized and indexed in terms of  a parameter vector P in 
the form: 
(1) 
where rt is the interest rate, Mt is the log of  high-powered money, It is 
a vector of  state variables or information at time t  which characterizes 
the  economy before  the Fed acts at time  t and is known  to the public 
as well as the Fed, and +t  is an innovation in Fed policy that cannot be 
forecast  by  the  public,  that  is,  it  is  independent  of  the  information 
vector It.  We have written the function in implicit form to allow for both 
interest rate rules and money stock rules or for combination rules. 
The Fed confronts a public demand for high-powered money function, 
which we will write as: 
(2) 
f(rt7  Mt,  P,  It, 4%) =  0, 
drt,  Mt,  It, P, y,  st> =  0, 126  Robert J. Shiller 
where y is a vector of parameters and St is a vector of innovations in pub- 
lic behavior. Public behavior depends on P through their reaction to the 
Fed policy rule. Equation (2)  is a reduced form equation for the rest of 
the macroeconomic model, taking either rt or Mt  as exogenous. 
Equations  (1) and  (2) represent  a two-equation  model  in two un- 
knowns, rt and Mt.  The solution to the model, or reduced form is: 
(3) 
(4) 
Another  reduced  form  equation from the macroeconomic model  gives 
the price level: 
(5) 
It =  hl (P,  It, +t, y,  St) 
Mt =  h2  (P,  It,  +t, y,  at). 
Pt =  h3 (P,  It, +t, 7,  St)  7 
and  from  this  equation  we  can  derive  the  expected  rate  of  inflation 
Et(Ptll -  Pt) and hence the rationally expected real interest rate: 
(6)  rt -  Et(Pt+l -  Pt) =  h(p,  It, +t, Y,  St). 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 concern the way this reduced form equation derived 
from the structural equations of  our model depends on P. 
One fundamental  problem  we face in  explaining  such models  econ- 
ometrically  is  finding  identifying  restrictions.  One  must  find  certain 
exogenous variables that we know shock equation (2)  without shocking 
equation ( 1  ) and may be used as instruments to estimate ( 1  ) consistently 
and other exogenous variables that we know shock equation (1) with- 
out shocking equation  (2)  and may be used to estimate equation  (2) 
consistently. The problem is  that it is difficult to find any variable that 
we can  be  confident shocks one equation without  shocking the  other. 
When expectations are involved in  the behavior that underlies  (1  ) and 
(2),  then anything that is publicly known might in principle affect both 
equations. 
There is  a literature  on estimation of  the demand for money and a 
smaller  literature  on  the  estimation  of  Fed  reaction functions,  which 
might  be  used  to try  to examine  some of  the hypotheses.  We do not 
believe, however,  that  estimates are trustworthy for this purpose.  One 
reason is  that this literature generally does not handle the simultaneous 
equations estimation problem well. When instrumental variables are used 
there is generally no discussion, let alone a convincing one, to justify the 
assumption  that  the  exclusion  restrictions  and  exogeneity  assumptions 
are  justified. This  defect is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  with  slow- 
moving variables and  short samples the small sample properties of  the 
K-class estimators may differ widely from those  predicted by the usual 
asymptotic sampling theory. 127  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
For the purpose of  formulating policy, we  need to know the model. 
For the purpose of  evaluating the hypotheses noted in the introduction, 
however, it may not be necessary to estimate the model. It may instead 
be necessary to find some change in p. 
The first hypothesis noted in the introduction asserts that the structure 
of  the economy is such that rt -  Et(Pt+l -  Pt) is independent of  either 
the Federal Reserve parameter vector /3  or the random variable 4t. If  we 
can find (P~  or a change in  p, then the real rate should be uncorrelated 
with it. 
The  second hypothesis implies that  if  +t =  0 (i.e.,  the Fed is com- 
pIetely predictable), then rt -  Et(Pt+l)  +  Et(Pt)  is independent of  /3. 
Changes in  the  parameter  p of  the  policy  rule  should  not  affect  the 
random properties of  the real rate. If  (P$  is random, then this hypothesis 
has no unambiguous interpretation with a model of  this generality. The 
division of  Fed policy into “predictable” or “unpredictable” components 
might be  achieved, for example, by  positing a money stock rule of  the 
form 
(7) 
and then we might interpret the hypothesis to mean that the behavior of 
real interest rates is independent of p. 
The third hypothesis, like the second, cannot be  defined  unambigu- 
ously until we  decide how to divide Fed behavior into components that 
were and others that were not predictable  in  advance by  the policy ef- 
fectiveness interval. If  we write: 
(7’) 
so that fS(Itpk,  p)  is the component of  Fed policy known in advance by 
the policy  effectiveness interval  k, then the hypotheses  might be inter- 
preted to imply that the interest rate is independent of  p. 
Unfortunately,  although in casual discussions it is often assumed that 
the hypotheses are well defined, alternative  interpretations are possible 
which  would  be  represented  by  different versions of  (7) or  (7’)  and 
would  in  turn be subject to different approaches for testing them.  For 
example,  we  might  break  down  money  into  multiplicative  predictable 
and unpredictable components, we  might allow f3 in  (7’)  to be multi- 
plied by  a function of  It, or we  might break down an interest  rate rule 
into predictable and unpredictable components. 
The only way we can discuss direct verification of  the second or third 
hypothesis cited in  the introduction  to this paper is to identify periods 
during which the Fed policy rule had a stable, repetitive nature and also 
to identify the time when the transitions between these periods occurred 
(i.e., where p changed). Our guide in identifying changes in the policy 
Mt =  f2(It, PI +  #Jt, 
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rule will be to look only for changes that were  announced by  the Fed 
and well understood  by  the public.  It is  inherently  a highly subjective 
business to try to identify periods in  which the Fed policy rule might be 
described  as repetitive and when  it changed. To evaluate hypothesis  2 
or 3 based on statistical  analysis, however,  we  have no alternative but 
to try. 
Measures of  Real Interest Rates 
As we have noted, it is impossible to measure the rationally expected 
real  interest  rate without  a statement of  faith in  a model  and, if  there 
are  unknown  parameters  in  the  model,  an  identification  of  a  sample 
period of  some length when the model held. If  we take the model above, 
then, before  looking at the data, we  begin with  prior distributions for 
the parameters p and y  and for the parameters of  the distributions of 4 
and  8.  We might then in principle update the priors with the data over 
a period when the policy rule was stable to get a joint posterior distribu- 
tion of  p and y  and other parameters.  This distribution  might then be 
used to produce a predictive distribution for the ex post real rate condi- 
tional  on  historical  data: f(rt -  APtcl I It), and  we  might  define the 
rationally  expected real  rate  as the expected value of  rt -  Apt+, from 
this predictive  distribution. 
This approach suffers from the problem of  describing our uncertainty 
about the nature and structure of  the model. A more parsimonious way 
to proceed  is to seek a simple empirical forecasting relation by finding 
the optimal linear forecast of  rt -  A8  +,  based on some small subset I,,, 
of It which seems particularly likely to be important in determining the 
predictive distribution f(rt -  Apt+, I It).  For example, we might regress 
rt -  Apt+, on its own lagged value to produce an autoregressive fore- 
casting relation. We will call the fitted values of  such a regression based 
on the subset of  information and regression coefficients the optimal linear 
forecast and denote it by L(rt -  I Iot).  Now one property of  such 
optimal linear forecasts is that L(rt -  1  I,,,) =  L(E(rt -  APt+l 
I It)  1 Int)  ;  that is, the optimal linear forecast of  the ex post real rate is the 
same as the optimal linear forecast of  the true (unobserved)  rationally 
expected real interest rate (see for example Shiller 1978). 
It is  a property  of  optimal linear forecasts that the variance  of the 
forecast is  less than or equal to the variance of  the variable forecasted 
(i.e., R2 2  1  ). If  we  know the optimal linear forecast variance, we can 
put bounds on the variance of  the true rationally expected real interest 
rate, i.e., its variance must lie between the variance of  the optimal linear 
forecast and the variance of  the ex post real rate. 
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lish that the Fed can control the optimal linear forecast of  the ex post 
real rate in the sense of  one of  our hypotheses (e.g., that it can, by chang- 
ing p, and without relying on unforeseen  shocks +t, affect the random 
properties of  the optimal linear forecast), then it can affect the random 
properties of  the true unobserved  rationally expected real interest rate. 
Since the projection of  the optimal linear forecast on Iot  is the same as 
the projection  of  the true rationally expected real interest rate on Iot, 
one cannot change the one without  changing the other  and hence one 
concludes that  one must  have  changed  at least the relationship of  the 
rationally expected real interest rate with 10. 
Empirical Verification Hypotheses 
General Approach 
Now we will explore interpretations and tests of  the three hypotheses 
along the lines suggested above. We will consider whether the hypotheses 
are plausible in view of the observed behavior of  nominal rates coupled 
with the fact that the precise timing and magnitude of  Fed actions are 
probably  exogenous and unforecastable. We will also consider the fact 
that the Fed  apparcntly  can  (and has) pegged  nominal  rates,  which 
means that there was a sharp reduction, to zero, in exogenous shocks to 
monetary policy at this time. 
Next we will consider whether the history of  the Federal Reserve system 
can be broken  down into subperiods in which the policy rule showed a 
distinctly  different  stochastic  behavior.  The subperiods  must  be long 
enough so that it makes sense to try to identify the policy rule from the 
data. We will argue that there is some reason to divide the monetary his- 
tory of  the twentieth century into three long periods: the period 1900 to 
1913, before the  Fed  was founded,  the period  1914 to 1950 of  early 
monetary policy  (which was unfortunately disrupted by two world wars 
and  a  major  depression),  and  the  period  1951 to the  present,  when 
modern monetary policy was practiced. 
Finally,  we  will  consider Granger-Sims  causality  tests  between  real 
interest  rates  and money  growth rates  and Barro unanticipated  money 
tests as ways of  evaluating these hypotheses. 
Behavior of  Nominal Interest Rates 
Members of  the Federal Reserve Board-and  of  the Trading Desk at 
New  York-have  the distinct  impression that they  can, whenever they 
wish, influence  nominal  interest  rates  in  a downward  direction by  in- 
creasing high-powered money and in an upward direction by decreasing 
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seen it happen with great reliability. Moreover, since they were involved 
in the decision relating to the conduct  of  monetary  policy, they have a 
clear idea whether their policy might be considered caused by economic 
circumstances and to what extent their policy might be viewed as a con- 
trolled experiment. Certainly the precise timing of  their policy is deter- 
mined  by  their  own choices, and if  interest  rates immediately respond 
reliably  when  they  do intervene,  it  is hard  to question  that  they  can 
control nominal interest rates in this manner. 
If  we accept, then, that when the Fed decides to intervene in the open 
market by  increasing high-powered money the nominal interest rate de- 
clines, it would appear that the Fed must have some influence over real 
interest  rates, and hypothesis  1 must be wrong. We usually think that 
increasing high-powered money is, if  anything, a signal of  higher infla- 
tion. It would seem implausible, then, that these lower interest rates are 
due to lower inflationary expectations. It is conceivable that exogenous 
increases in  the money stock might be a sign of  lower inflation over a 
certain time horizon if  the parameters of  our model were just right. But 
it seems inconceivable that such an explanation would reliably hold true 
for bonds of  all maturities for the history of  all monetary authorities for 
hundreds of  years. 
Even though the Fed knows it can drive the real interest rate at any 
moment in a desired direction, it does not follow that it can exert any 
systematic control over real interest rates; that is, hypothesis 2 or 3 may 
still be valid. To see how this might be the case, we  may hypothesize a 
demand for high-powered money function of  a form somewhat less gen- 
eral than expression (2) above: 
(8)  Mt yMt-1-t p(M*t -  Mt-1) +  qt 
O<p<l 
where 
(9)  M*t =  Pt +  mlYt -  m2rt -  m~(Et(Pt+l 
-  Pt)) +  m4-G 
and all coefficients m,,  m2,  m3, and m4  are greater than zero. The term 
yt  is an unforecastable error. Here we have assumed a simple stock ad- 
justment  model  although  more  general  adjustment  models  would  not 
affect the basic conclusions. The desired log money stock M*t is a func- 
tion of the log price level Pt, a measure of  aggregate economic activity 
Yt, the nominal  short interest rate  rt, the expected  inflation rate, and 
other exogenous real variables 2,. Substituting  (9) into  (8) and using 
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(10)  Mt =  (1 -  p1Mt-i +  pPt +  pmiyt -  pmzpt 
-  p(m2 +  m3)Et(Pt+1- Pt) +  W4-G  +  qt. 
Taking expectations conditional on information at time t and solving for 
EtPt, we get: 
(11)  EtPt =  (1 -  A) EJt +  AEtPt+l 
where 
Jt 3  AMt/p +  Mt-l -  mlYt +  m2pt -  m4Zt -  qt/p 
A =  (m2 +  m3) / (1 +  m2  +  m3) 
O<A<l. 
If  we  then  solve this rational  expectations equation  and assume stable 
price  behavior, that is,  a  price  level  that does not  diverge to infinity 
unless the money stock is increased to infinity as suggested in the rational 
expectations literature, or in this specific context by Sargent and Wallace 
(1975), we find: 
The model thus implies that the price level, as well as the nominal inter- 
est rate, embodies optimal forecasts of  AJtfl,  i =  0, 1, . . . . We can 
thus see how it is that the Fed may have the impression that it influences 
the real rate and could do so systematically when in fact it cannot. Sup- 
pose we hypothesize a money stock rule of  the form (7) above. Although 
the Fed may not be aware of  it, the public has divided its behavior into 
two  components : a  predictable  and an unpredictable  component.  The 
public has already formed anticipations of  all future movements in the 
money stock based on,  information about Fed policy that has unfolded to 
that point in time. If  the public anticipates  a policy of  greater increases 
in the money supply, then  nominal interest rates will by  (13) rise  as 
soon  as the  public  begins  to  collect  information  which  enables  it to 
anticipate this. If, on the one hand, the Fed delays expanding the money 
stock  longer  than  the  public  expected,  then  interest  rates  may  rise 
further still because of  the effect on real interest rates of  this “surprise” 
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back to the level given by (13)  .G If, on the other hand, the Fed increases 
the  money  growth  rates sooner than  the public  expected,  then interest 
rates may fall when they do this and may rise back to the level given by 
(13) when  the Fed is on target  again. 
Whenever  the Fed has  the  sense that its actions  are volitional,  that 
is, could  not  have  been  predicted  by  the market,  it  observes the cus- 
tomary  negative  relation  between  real  rates  and  high-powered  money. 
The Fed knows these shocks are exogenous and thus knows it has influ- 
ence over real rates. But the Fed rarely observes the effect of  its changes 
in its policy  rule  and, if  it  does not look deep into history,  has no in- 
formation  on its systemutic  ability to control real interest  rates. 
This analysis does not necessarily  suggest a scenario in which, as de- 
scribed, for  example,  by  Friedman  (1968), increases  in  high-powered 
money cause a decline in interest rates for a certain interval of  time  (the 
“liquidity  effect” period)  followed by  a  rise  in interest  rates above  its 
former  level  due  to  engendered  inflationary  expectations.  Friedman’s 
scenario might come about if unforeseen shocks constituted evidence that 
further money growth rates would be higher, in which  case inflationary 
expectations would  be immediately adjusted  upward,  and  if  temporary 
effects on real interest rates were sufficient to offset the rise in inflationary 
expectations. 
The crucial behavioral relation that gives the result that the Fed has no 
systematic influence  over real  interest  rates  is  embodied  in  expression 
(12), coupled  with  hypothesis  2, which  implies  that  the real variables 
in Jt are not subject to systematic Fed control. Expression  (12) then says 
that the price level incorporates all information currently available about 
future money  supplies. Without  this  relation,  the Fed must  be able to 
control real rates or the price level must be explosive,  even with  stable 
monetary policy. As an illustration,  suppose the Fed announces that the 
money stock today will be decreased by 3% below what the public had 
exp?cted, but that all future money  growth rates will be unchanged.  By 
(12), and hypothesis 2, and assuming for simplicity that  p =  m3 =  m4 
=  0, the price  level must  drop immediately, and by  (13) the nominal 
rate will be unchanged. It seems unlikely that the price level would drop 
immediately by 3 % ,  however. If  the price level is sluggish, can we retain 
hypothesis 2? To retain it would mean that the real money stock falls and 
hence, by the money demand equation (9  ) ,  that the nominal rates rt must 
increase. If  the real rate is constant, this must imply that expected inflation 
will increase. If  this expected inflation is rational, then it must be the case 
that actual  inflation increases, at least on average. Thus, the price level 
6.  If monetary shocks show persistence, i.e., serially uncorrelated movements in 
q5  create serially correlated movements in the real rate, as represented, for example, 
in expression (14’) below, then the real rate will not return to “target” immediately. 133  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
tends to increase in  the following period,  rather  than decrease,  which 
throws the system further out of  equilibrium. By the same reasoning the 
price level is expected to increase even faster during the following period, 
and, by  induction, must  explode to  infinity even with  a  stable money 
If  we  assume only hypothesis  3, then  (12) still must hold, but now 
we  have  lost  the proposition  that  the  future  real  rate  and future real 
income terms in  Jt+i,  i =  0, . . . 00  are independent of  the entire sys- 
tematic component of  monetary policy. Since our hypothesis then does 
not constrain these y  and p terms in J,  it says nothing about how the price 
level responds to current information about Fed policy, and so (12) has 
itself  no content in this regard.  Hypothesis  3 does imply that real vari- 
ables  are  independent  of  information  about  monetary  policy  known 
earlier by the policy effectiveness interval. The price level, today, opti- 
mally  incorporates  all  information  about future  monetary  policy  that 
was known then. 
While this behavioral assumption in  (1  2) may be plausible for prices 
of  speculative  commodities,  this  seems  improbable  for  the aggregate 
price level judging from the way many prices are actually set. It is not 
just that  prices  are “sticky” or “sluggish,” but that they are not set in 
anticipation of  future monetary policy. It might not be too unreasonable 
to suppose that the prices of  speculative commodities take into account a 
very simple, repetitive seasonal pattern in money growth rates. It is also 
conceivable that if the money stock has a simple predictable pattern over 
the  business  cycle, then  the prices  of  certain  speculative  commodities 
might in effect incorporate this information. But will wages be set in this 
way? Will the price of  haircuts? It seems likely that at least some modifi- 
cation of  equation  (12) is called for to allow for other factors that help 
determine the aggregate price level, and this will then invalidate hypothe- 
ses 2 and 3. 
One reason that ( 12) and our hypotheses seem implausible is that the 
public  is certainly not  consciously  aware of  it. News  reports  routinely 
ascribe movements in the stock market indices to new information, but 
changes in aggregate price indices, while a subject of  great public inter- 
est, seem never to be ascribed to new information about future monetary 
policy. Hypothesis 2 requires that if  the Fed announces a change in its 
long-run  target,  the  announcement  itself  (if  credible,  and  not  already 
discounted by  the public)  should have an immediate effect on the price 
level and  on the nominal  interest  rate. Judging casually from the lack 
of  public  awareness  of  such  an effect, we  think  that the  effect is cer- 
tainly not likely to be a very striking one. 
Further  evidence  on  the  plausibility  of  (12) and  (13) can be ob- 
tained  by  considering the  effects of  the Fed’s announcing that interest 
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rates will be pegged at a certain level. Before we consider this, we must 
point out that this has actually happened. 
At the  end of  April  1942 the Federal Open Market Committee di- 
rected  the twelve Federal  Reserve Banks to purchase  all treasury bills 
offered at a discount rate of  3/s of  1  % and in August directed the Federal 
Reserve  Banks to  give  the  seller  an option  to repurchase  bills of  the 
same maturity at the same rate. An ascending rate structure on govern- 
ment bonds was also pegged, peaking at 2.5% for the longest bonds. A 
demand for short-term bills persisted for a while with this structure, but, 
as confidence grew that the Fed would continue to peg long rates at this 
level, it evaporated. In July 1947, the Fed thus ended the peg on treasury 
bills. In December  1947 the Fed also lowered its buying price to near 
par on long-term  bonds which, with the fixed rate structure, had come 
to sell above par, but felt obligated not to let bond prices fall below par, 
until after the Accord in March 195  1. Some variation in long-term inter- 
est rates was allowed; in particular, the Fed allowed prices of  long-term 
bonds  to rise  above the pegged  price, which happened  briefly in early 
1946. 
Price controls were also first imposed in April 1942, with the General 
Maximum Price Regulation  and were  finally lifted  with the expiration 
of  the Price Control Act on  1 July  1946. Price controls were not reim- 
posed until the Korean conflict, when in January 1951 an official freeze 
on most prices and wages was announced. In the intervening period the 
only important  efforts to control the  aggregate price level were volun- 
tary:  the  Economic  Stabilization  Agency  efforts just  before  the  price 
freeze with the Korean  conflict, and the voluntary credit restraint pro- 
gram. We thus have a period of  4.5 years in which prices were free and 
long-term  interest  rates pegged  and  a one-year  period  in which prices 
were free and short-term interest  rates were pegged. This time interval, 
moreover, came immediately  after  a four-year  period  which,  although 
under price  controls, was  characterized by  a development of  “pent-up 
inflation” in the sense that the money supply increased dramatically un- 
der the pegged interest rate. 
What does the model predict about the effects of  an announcement by 
the Fed that interest rates are to be pegged at a certain level? Here we 
are confronted with a basic problem of  the transition from one rational 
expectations  equilibrium  to  another  for  which  rational  expectations 
models are no guide. Sargent and Wallace (1975) highlighted this prob- 
lem when they pointed out that in their model, for which p = 1, the in- 
terest rate is related  only to future changes in money; hence the money 
stock and price level are not determined by the fixing of  the interest rate. 
Although  in  our model p # 1 so that  a lagged money  stock enters, it 
is unclear what relevance the money  stock before  the interest rate peg 
was announced has to the ultimate rational expectations equilibrium. The 135  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
price level after a rational expectations equilibrium is reached is still not 
determined by the model. 
If  a rational expectations equilibrium is attained under hypothesis 2, 
then we do know that expression  (13) must hold with rt at the pegged 
rate, and this means that  expected  future changes in  the money stock 
must move in  such a way as to cause inflationary expectations to move 
opposite to the real rate. If, let us suppose, the real rate and exogenous 
factors are nearly constant, then the appropriate monetary policy is es- 
sentially to keep all changes in M  at the appropriate level, equal to the 
pegged rate minus the real rate. The Fed, to keep interest rates low, es- 
sentially must merely keep money growth rates low. Fed policy must be 
to set  an example with small money  growth rates,  rather than,  as was 
actually the case, to conduct massive open market purchases when rates 
started to rise. The Fed does not try to offset movements in interest rates 
in the usual way; rather, it sets a monetary policy which implies deflation 
(and hence deflationary expectations)  whenever the real rate is shocked 
upward, so that the public prevents the nominal rate from ever moving. 
Clearly, the Fed was not doing the right thing to cause the economy to 
converge on a rational expectations equilibrium with stable prices at the 
pegged rate, as they essentially said (though not in these words) in their 
arguments with the Treasury. We may say that the economy was not in 
a rational expectations equilibrium of  the kind with stable prices, as de- 
scribed by  (12) or (1  3). But it was not in an unstable rational expecta- 
tions equilibrium either. When price controls were lifted in July 1946, we 
saw not a one-shot big increase in the price level but  (after a relatively 
modest immediate jump in prices) a serially correlated smooth increase 
in prices (see fig. 4.5 below). This means that very negative real interest 
rates, apparently caused by  monetary  phenomena,  could be forecasted 
during  this  transition  period.  This  situation persisted  for a  while  and 
then  the  economy  settled  in,  not  to  a  hyperinflation,  but  an ordinary 
recession. 
Founding of  the Federal Reserve System 
In the original Federal Reserve Act of  1913 the first purpose of  the 
Federal Reserve system defined in the opening paragraph is “to provide 
an elastic currency,” and “to accommodate commerce and btisiness” (sec- 
tion 14). From the discussion of  the time there is at least one unambigu- 
ous implication  of  this purpose:  namely, to provide  a larger supply of 
currency toward the end of  the year when the demand for currency was 
higher,  in  part  because  of  the  crop harvest  and  Christmas  shopping.‘ 
7. In its first annual report to Congress (1915), the Federal Reserve Board seems 
to say, in clear language, that it will mitigate seasonal fluctuations in interest rates: 
“It should  not,  however,  be  assumed that  because  a  bank  is  a  Reserve  Bank  its 
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Under the national banking system, this higher demand for currency was 
not accommodated, and the result was pronounced seasonality of  nomi- 
nal interest rates. This  seasonality in  nominal  interest rates  apparently 
vanished after the establishment of  the Federal Reserve system and was 
apparently replaced by a seasonality in currency in circulation as docu- 
mented by Macaulay  (1938). Carter Glass  (1927) listed the elimina- 
tion of this seasonality as one of  the major achievements of  his Federal 
Reserve Act. 
The pronounced  decline in seasonality in nominal interest rates after 
the founding of  the Federal  Reserve  at the  end  of  1913 can be seen 
clearly in figure 4.1. An additive seasonal factor  (plotted with the same 
scale as the nominal interest rate above) computed with the Census X-11 
program is shown. This seasonal factor is computed as a 3 X 3 moving 
average of  the difference of  the corrected series from a 13-month aver- 
age. This implies a triangular  moving average extending  over nearly  6 
years. Thus, the fact that the seasonality does not disappear immediately 
in  1914 is  mainly due to an artifact of  the Census X-11 program. The 
seasonal pattern does show a marked decline about as soon as it could. 
The  question  that  apparently  never  occurred  to  anyone  then  was 
whether  the Fed had, by  adopting the announced policy of  eliminating 
seasonal variations, eliminated a seasonal pattern in real interest rates. A 
stable seasonal pattern in ex post rates implies a seasonal pattern in ex 
ante rates since seasonal factors are forecastable. All our hypotheses may 
be taken to imply that the elimination of  the seasonal factor in nominal 
rates should have changed the seasonal pattern in inflation rates so that 
the seasonal pattern in real interest rates should remain unchanged. 
When we look at the seasonal pattern of  the ex post real interest rates 
(fig. 4.2), we  see an apparent disruptions in the seasonal pattern of  real 
in  ordinary times, used  reluctantly  and sparingly. . . . Time  and  experience  will 
show what the seasonal variation in the credit demands and facilities in each of the 
Reserve  Banks of  the several districts will  be and when and to what  extent a Re- 
serve Bank may,  without  violating its  special function  as a  guardian  of  banking 
reserves,  engage in banking and  credit operations. . . . There will  be times when 
the great weight of  their influence and resources should be exerted to secure a freer 
extension of  credit and an casing of  ratcs in  order that  the borrowing community 
shall be able to obtain  accommodations at the lowest rates warranted  by existing 
conditions and be  adequately  protected  against exorbitant rates  of  interest. There 
will just  as certainly, however,  be  times when  prudence  and  a  proper  regard  for 
the common good will  require that an opposite course be pursued and  accommo- 
dations curtailed.” The Board said  it  gave  “certain assurance that whatever  funds 
might be necessary for the gradual and orderly marketing of  the cotton crop would 
be available at moderate rates.” 
8. The disruption is not due to the spectacular deflation of  1920, since the Census 
X-1 1 program automatically excludes such outliers. The Census X-1 1 is still capable 














1915  1920  1925 
Four-to-six-month prime  commercial  paper  rate  (above) 
and additive Census X-11 seasonal factors (below), monthly 
data. Vertical lines correspond to January of the year noted 
directly  below.  Source  of  prime  rate  series:  1900-1924, 
Banking and Monetary Statistics, 191  4-41,  Board of  Gover- 
nors of  the Federal Reserve system 1943, table 120; 1925- 
29, Macro Data Library, Board of  Governors of  the Fed- 
eral Reserve system. 
interest rates after the founding of  the Federal Reserve, but a reassertion 
of  the seasonal pattern  roughly  as strong as before.  One is tempted to 
interpret this disrupted period as a transitional period when the economy 
converged on a new rational expectations equilibrium in accordance with 
hypothesis 2. There is potentially an element of  truth to this story; how- 
ever, we note that the seasonal pattern in inflation rates had substantially 
greater amplitude than that in nominal interest rates, and so it is better 
to say that  the  seasonal pattern  in inflation  rates  drowned  rather  than 
offset the declining seasonal  pattern  in  nominal  rates.  All that we  can 
conclude from this data is that we can't say with any confidence whether 
a  policy  of  eliminating  the seasonal  pattern  in  nominal  rates  reduced 
the seasonal pattern in real rates. The seasonal pattern in inflation  rates 
is so much  bigger,  and  rather  unstable  itself,  that we  cannot  find  any 
of  a pre-1913 seasonal factor  (as well as a post-World  War I1 seasonal factor)  in 
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Ex post real interest rate, the 4-6-month  prime commercial 
Japer rate minus the 5-month inflation  rate based  on the 
BLS  wholesale price index of  all commodities  (above) and 
idditive  Census X-1  1  seasonal  factors  (below).  Vertical 
lines correspond to January of  the  year noted directly below. 
Source of  price  series:  Bureau of  Labor Statistics,  1900- 
1913, Bulletin no.  149  (1914); 1913-19,  Bulletin no. 269; 
1920-29,  Macro Data Library, Board of  Governors of  the 
Federal Reserve system. 
evidence here contrary to the hypotheses. Carter Glass was too quick to 
congratulate himself  on  the real consequences  of  his  Federal  Reserve 
Act.g 
A Policy Rule Change Marked by the Accord 
It is commonly asserted that the Accord  of  March  1951 marked an 
abrupt change in Fed policy. This was the date that the Fed was freed 
9.  The seasonal  pattern  in  real  interest  rates  may be  spurious.  Since  nominal 
rates showed less pronounced seasonality than inflation rates, there was an incen- 
tive in the fall, when agricultural prices were low, for farmers to hold their  crops 
off  the market and borrow at the nominal rate. Their efforts to do so were appar- 
ently hampered by credit rationing by  the banks.  It is  possible  that there was no 
seasonal factor in  real rates actually available to farmers. 
One effect of  Fed policy not shown in  the data may be the reduction  of  credit 
rationing in the fall. Hypothesis 2 would then suggest that the seasonal pattern  in 
inflation should disappear, making for a spurious apparent  reduction  in  real  rate 
seasonality, which we do not observe. Instead, this interpretation  suggests the Fed 






from the obligation to peg interest rates and a time of  new-found concern 
with monetary aggregates and countercyclical monetary policy. One can 
see from figure 4.3 that the rate of  growth of  the money supply  (M-1) 
before the Accord was less strongly seasonal and more distinctly marked 
by  erratic  longer-term  movements.  After  the  Accord  (actually,  after 
the war) the growth of  the money stock was dominated much more by 
a very strong seasonal factor. The strong seasonal factor in the money 
stock, incidentally, first appeared around 1942, when interest rates were 
pegged and, of  course, what  seasonality in  nominal  interest rates  still 
remained was then totally eliminated. It appears that the Fed revised its 
seasonal adjustment factors at this time and then, following the Accord, 
became concerned that the seasonally adjusted money stock should grow 
smoothly. In so doing, the Fed perpetuated the seasonal movements in 
the money stock that were appropriate to a short-term interest rate with 
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Fig. 4.3  Money growth  rates before seasonal adjustment, 6-month 
percentage change in M-1 over succeeding 6-month period 
at annual rates, 1925-77,  semiannually (June and Decem- 
ber). Marks on horizontal axis correspond to June figure. 
Source: 1925-40, Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914- 
41, Board  of  Governors of  the  Federal Reserve system, 
1943, table 9; 1941-70,  Banking  and Monetary  Statistics, 
1941-70,  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
system, 1976, p.  5 and table 1.1; 1971-77,  Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, passim. 140  Robert J. Shiller 
seasonal  factors would  tend  to remain  unchanged  as long  as the Fed 
perpetuates  this  seasonal  pattern.  Apparently,  the  seasonal  pattern  in 
money  demand became more pronounced  after the war,  and so a sea- 
sonal pattern in nominal rates has reappeared, as documented by Diller 
(1971  ) and Sargent (  1971  ) . 
It appears, then, that there was a substantial change in the Fed policy 
rule after World War 11. If  we can assume that the stochastic structure 
of the rest  of  the economy did  not show an equally  substantial  change 
following the war, then we can look at the behavior of  the real interest 
rate and perhaps find some disconfirmation  of  our hypotheses if  the be- 
havior of  real rates changes. 
A  plot  of  the  ex  post  real  short-term  interest  rate  (the 4-6  month 
commercial  paper  rate  minus  the  succeeding  5-month  change  in  the 
wholesale price index)  appears in figure 4.4  and the interest  rates  and 
inflation rates in figure 4.5. Indeed, there is a striking change at the time 
of  the Accord. The last big movement downward in the real interest rate 
was due to the surge in inflation at the end of  1950 which provoked the 
Accord,  as well as the price controls of  the Korean conflict. After that, 
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Fig. 4.4  Ex post  real rate of  interest, 19OO:I to  1977:II, June and 
December, equal to the interest rate minus the inflation rate 
plotted in fig. 4.5. Marks on the horizontal axis correspond 
to  the  June  figure.  Fama’s  sample period  is  enclosed be- 
tween vertical lines. 141  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
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Fig. 4.5  Annualized  percent  change in  the  wholesale  price  index 
over  succeeding 5  months  (dotted  line)  and  4-6-month 
prime commercial paper rate (solid line), 1900:  I to 1977 :  11, 
June  and  December. Marks  on  the  horizontal axis  corre- 
spond to the June figure. Fama’s sample period is enclosed 
by  vertical lines. Source of  wholesale price index:  Bureau 
of  Labor  Statistics,  1900-1913  Bulletin  no.  149  (1914); 
1913-19,  Bulletin no.  269; 1920-77,  Macro Data Library, 
Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve system. Source 
of  prime commercial paper rate:  1900-1924,  Banking  and 
Monetary  Statistics, 1914-41,  Board  of  Governors of  the 
Federal  Reserve  system,  1943;  1925-77,  Macro Data Li- 
brary, Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve System. 
These ex post movements  in the real interest rate before the Accord 
are not an indication  of  movements  in rationally  expected  real interest 
rates  unless  they  are forecastable.  The  apparent  serial  correlation  in 
figure  4.4  suggests  that  they  are,  and this  is  confirmed by  the simple 
autoregressions in table 4.1. The F tests indicate significant coefficients 
except  for  the  period  immediately  after the founding  of  the Fed. The 
standard deviation of  the fitted value (the lower figure in the last column) 
which  is a measure  of  the  standard deviation of  the true rationally ex- 
pected real interest rate is much higher before 1951 than after. 
To the extent that we are willing to assume that the structure of  the 
rest  of  the  economy was  the same before  and  after the Accord,  these 
results clearly provide further disconfirmation  of  hypothesis  1. It is true Table 4.1  Ex Post Real Rate Autoregressions 
Coefficient of 
R2  F  o(RES1D) 
Time Period  Const  Seasonal  DeP -  7  Dep -  .,  tnext  Sig(F)  o(F1TTED) 
1901:II to 1913:I 
1.73  4.79  .383  -  .482  .244 





.620  1.48  .493  -.186  .lo4  2.08  21.6 
(.107)  (.184)  (2.49)  (- .942)  (-.416)  12.87  7.36 
.236  3.62  .481  -.185  .15 1  4.3 1  15.33 
(.081)  (.884)  (3.55)  (-.137)  (-.679)  .859  6.45 
1915:II to 1929:II 
1901:II to 1929:II 
-2.66  4.33 
(-.926)  (1.07)  1915:II to 1950:II 
.493  -.116  .172  5.85  16.9 
(4.04)  ( -  .950)  ( -  .327)  .131  7.71 
1952:II to 1977:II  .loo  .375  .324 
(.135)  (.369)  (2.38) 
.394  .360  10.4 




Dependent variable is the ex post real rate  (i.e., the 4-6  month 
prime commercial paper rate minus the succeeding actual 5-month 
inflation  rate computed from the wholesale price index) as shown 
in fig. 4.4.  Data is semiannual, for June and December.  Seasonal 
dummy is  zero in  June,  1 in  December.  Numbers in  parentheses 
are t-statistics,  t...t  is  ?-statistic of  dependent variable  lagged one 
more time  in  a  different  regression  (presented  here  instead  of  a 
Durbin-Watson statistic). The term o(RES1D) is standard error of 
regression;  o(F1lTED) is  estimated  standard  deviation  of  fitted 
values,  equal to o(RESID)(R2/(1-R2)1’2. 143  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
that the period before  1951 was characterized by bigger wars than the 
period after. The depression also came before (although it is less clear 
that this represents a change in structure of  the economy). Nonetheless, 
the change in the stochastic behavior of real rates with the Accord is so 
striking that  one is tempted  to conclude that the  change in monetary 
policy had something to do with it. 
Whether or not the change also disconfirms hypothesis 2 is not some- 
thing we  can  say with any assurance.  Indeed, given that the monetary 
policy  is not deterministic,  and cannot be described  in terms of  just  a 
money  stock rule or just  an interest rate rule,  then we  have not given 
the hypothesis a precise enough definition to evaluate it formally. 
One might attribute the greater movements in the real rate before the 
Accord  merely  to  greater  unforecastable  monetary  shocks  before  the 
Accord. By the same token the relatively low variance of  real rates before 
the founding of  the Fed might be ascribed to a more predictable mone- 
tary rule under the National Banking System. This argument would not 
apply  to  the pegged  rate  period,  between  1942-51,  when  monetary 
policy was quite forecastable. 
It is not obvious whether Fed policy was less predictable in the twen- 
ties,  say,  as  compared  with  the  sixties.  One  must  remember that big 
movements  in  the  money  stock  are  no  indication  of  unpredictability 
since presumably  they were triggered primarily by economic conditions 
in a way that may well have been understood by businessmen at the time. 
Monetary policy actions need not be known in advance for there to be 
predictability  in the sense of  hypothesis  2 as long as these are revealed 
by public information before they take place. 
We  do  know  that  a  change  in  the  policy  rule  occurred  after  the 
Accord. It would not be unreasonable to attribute the change in the be- 
havior  of  real  interest  rates  to the observed  change in  the  systematic 
policy rule, and thus consider this change as evidence against hypothesis 
2. Unfortunately, we cannot feel very comfortable in our assurance that 
this  is  so. We  are left, then, with  only  a  suggestion that hypothesis  2 
might be misguided. Barring a controlled experiment contrasting alterna- 
tive deterministic, announced policy rules, we are unlikely ever to find 
better  information  concerning the  direct  empirical  implications  of  hy- 
pothesis 2. 
Before we conclude, however, we note that recent literature on nominal 
interest  rates for the period  1953-71  alone might seem to lead US  to a 
different evaluation of  the hypotheses. This literature, which was initiated 
by  Fama  (1975), has  confined attention  to this  period  because,  it is 
claimed, it represents the only available time period in which the data on 
inflation rates are good and in which prices are uncontrolled. Fama said 
that to study real rates before 1953 is “meaninglessf7  because the Bureau 
of  Labor Statistics  used  poorer  sampling  techniques  before  1953  in 144  Robert J. Shiller 
computing  the  consumer  price  index  (which  Fama used), in that it 
sampled more items on a three-month basis than  it does today. If  one 
looks at figure 4.4, one notes that this period  (marked off  between paral- 
lel lines)  shows remarkable stability of  the real rate of  interest.1° This 
was also a period when the Fed  apparently  thought it was conducting 
countercyclical  monetary  policy  and  is  usually  described  as  having 
caused  at least one credit crunch. Fama’s evidence appears then to be 
evidence which makes us less sure of  our dismissal of  hypothesis  1, that 
the Fed cannot influence real rates at all. 
In his paper, Fama showed two remarkable results about short-term 
interest rates and prices for this sample period, both of  which are con- 
sistent  with his joint hypothesis  that  ex  ante real rates  of  interest  are 
constant and expectations are rational. First, while both short-term inter- 
est rates and inflation rates show significant autocorrelation, ex post real 
rates do not. This result can be seen again by looking at Fama’s monthly 
data on one-month treasury bill rates and one-month inflation rates (fig. 
4.6).  The inflation rate appears approximately as white noise superim- 
posed on the interest rate series, except for the period  1960-66,  when 
the short rate shows a trend not matched by a trend in inflation rates. The 
serial correlation we observed in table 4.1 came about, apparently, from 
post-1971  data and perhaps  also from our use  of  five-month inflation 
data,  which  is  smoother  than  one-month  data.  Second, Fama showed 
that if  inflation rates are regressed on interest rates the coefficient of  the 
interest rate is nearly one (.97, t =  10.0, with his data) and then, when 
the lagged price level is added as a second explanatory variable, the co- 
efficient of  the interest  rate remains near one (.87, t =  7.2) while the 
lagged inflation rate has a small coefficient (.  1 1, t =  1.6) which is insig- 
10. This figure  shows the  inflation  as measured  by the  wholesale, rather than 
consumer price index, but the plots using the consumer price index, for the period 
for which it is available, look similar. 
That Fama’s hypothesis did not hold before is certainly well known. The famous 
“Gibson paradox,”  noted as early as 1884, was a  positive  correlation between  in- 
terest rates and price levels, not rates of change of prices.  While the correlation is 
most pronounced for long-term interest rates,  it was also present  with short-term 
rates for British  data in the  century before  World  War 11,  and  over  this  period 
there was really no correlation between short rates and inflation  rates (Shiller and 
Siegel  1977). 
A plot of  an ex post real British consol rate (subject to an arbitrary assumption 
about inflation  rates past  1977 which makes the more recent real rates unreliable) 
from 1729 to the present appears in Shiller and Siegel  1977. This  real  long-term 
interest rate is very volatile and at times negative. It was found that nominal long- 
term  rates  over this  period  moved  in  such  a  way  as to  exacerbate,  rather  than 
mitigate,  the effects  of  inflation  on  long-term real  rates, i.e.,  nominal  long rates 
were negafively correlated with the appropriately defined long-term inflation  rate. 145  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
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Fig. 4.6  Fama's  data,  February  1953 to  July  1971. Solid  line  is 
inflation rate, equal to  -1200  A,  and  dotted line is  one- 
month treasury bill rate, equal to 1200 R,  where At and R, 
are defined in Fama 1975. Division marks on the horizontal 
axis  correspond  to the  first  month  of  the year numbered 
directly below.  Data  courtesy of  E.  Fama. 
nificant.l* It seems at first remarkable that the lagged inflation rate should 
be of  so little benefit in forecasting inflation,  but when one looks at the 
data one sees why this  is the case.  There is  a  great deal of  month-to- 
month noise in the consumer price index, and so the lagged inflation rate 
is a poor indicator of  current inflation. What is more remarkable is that 
the coefficient of  the interest rate should come out so close to one, which 
is its theoretical  value  if  the ex  ante real  interest  rate is constant  and 
inflation anticipations  are true mathematical expectations. 
It should  be pointed  out that under Fama's  hypothesis  residuals  are 
serially uncorrelated,  and if we wished to estimate the coefficient of  the 
interest rate, then ordinary least squares is appropriate and the standard 
errors not  compromised  by  possible  serial correlation.  If  our theory is 
11. Fama used the rate of  change of  the purchasing power of  money as his de- 
pendent variable; i.e., his dependent variable is A, =  -(P, -  Pt-l)/Pt  rather than 
(P, -  P,-l)/Z'-l.  When  we  used  his  data, we  multiplied  A,  by  -1200  and 
called this the inflation  rate. We have reserved  the sign of  his coefficient to accord 
with our definition. 146  Robert J. Shiller 
that the after-tax real rate is constant, then this coefficient is an estimate 
of  1 -  T, where  T is  the  marginal  tax  bracket  of  the  “representative 
investor.” If  we assume normal residuals, then ordinary least squares is 
clearly the appropriate procedure under Fama’s  hypothesis to estimate 
the coefficient in the regression.12 Fama’s regression of  inflation on in- 
terest rates  alone provided  an estimate of  1 -  T so close to one as to 
imply that the “representative tax bracket”  is zero. Feldstein and Sum- 
mers  (1978~)  concluded that the after-tax real interest rate relevant to 
the  typical  investment  decision  should  be  computed  with,  in  effect, 
(1 -  T) roughly in the vicinity of  .8 to 1  .O,  depending on depreciation 
and equity yields.13 Fama’s estimate of  .87 with the inflation variable in 
the regression is dominated  by the previous  estimate, since by Fama’s 
theory the inflation rate is an extraneous variable in the regression. 
If, however, we  are more interested in  an alternative hypothesis that 
makes inflation rates unrelated to interest rates and serially correlated, 
then the ordinary t-test on the coefficient is not valid. The t-test is a like- 
lihood ratio test in which the universe does not include the possibility of 
serially correlated residuals. Thus, we do not know from Fama’s highly 
significant coefficient on the  interest  rate whether  or not the  observed 
relation between interest and inflation might easily have come about by 
a “trend” or “long cycle” or other low-frequency component in the inter- 
est rate which by sheer chance happened to be correlated with a similar 
component in the inflation series. Fama’s good Durbin-Watson statistic 
is  no  assurance,  as  Granger  and  Newbold  (1977) have  pointed  out, 
that this is not a problem. One can get some impression of  the likelihood 
of  such  an  alternative explanation  of  the  correlation  between  interest 
and inflation by looking at figure 4.6. Clearly, the short-run movements 
in the price level are not explained by the interest rates. This impression 
is confirmed by  running Fama’s regression with the dependent variable 
lagged or led, to throw it out of  alignment with his interest rate data. The 
fit of  his equation is hardly changed. The R2  rises from  .29 in Fama’s 
regression to .30 with a led inflation rate as the dependent variable and 
falls to .27 with  a lagged inflation rate as the dependent ~ariab1e.l~  In 
any event,  the  alignment  is  not  really  correct  with  Fama’s  regression 
either.  Fama’s  interest  rate data are based  on  midpoints  of  bid-asked 
12.  The residuals do, however, fail the David-Hartley-Pearson studentized range 
test of  normality at the 5% level. The studentized range in the residuals regression 
of  inflation on a constant and the interest rate for the full sample period  is  6.42, 
and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.77. 
13. Feldstein and Summers’ arguments applied to long-term interest rates, which 
might be connected, via term structure phenomena, to short rates. 
14. These statistics refer  to a regression of  the inflation rate on a constant and 
the  interest rate over the  longest  possible  sample with  the  data series  shown  in 
fig. 4.6. 147  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
spreads for the last day of the preceding month. The Bureau of  Labor 
Statistics  (1971) reports that it  collects food prices on three consecu- 
tive days early in the month. Thus food prices, which in 1971 had a total 
weight of  .224 in  the consumer price index, are nearly  30 days out of 
alignment.15 Rents and items for which prices are obtained by mail, in 
contrast, are reported  as of  the fifteenth of  the month, and the pricing 
of other items priced monthly  extends over the entire calendar  month. 
Many items are still priced only every three months. We thus could not 
hope with  such data to find a  short-run  (or high-frequency)  relation- 
ship, and it is hardly appropriate to dismiss results based on earlier data 
for this reason. 
The explanatory power in the interest rate series does not come about 
from a simple trend either. If  one runs Fama’s regression with a linear 
time trend term added, this variable does not come in as significant. The 
explanatory power instead comes primarily from a couple of  humps in 
the interest and inflation series. The first hump begins at the bottom of 
the recession that occurred in 1954 and ends at the bottom of  the reces- 
sion that occurred in 1958. The other hump starts after the credit crunch 
of  1966 and ends in the recession of  1971. Some explanatory power also 
appears to reside in the downturn of  interest rates  in  the recession of 
1953-54,  at the very beginning of  the sample. In contrast, the period be- 
tween  1958 and  1966 shows an upward trend in interest rates with no 
matching upward trend in inflation rates. Carlson  (1977) showed that 
Fama’s regression fits very poorly over this sample period,  and the hy- 
pothesis that the coefficient is 1 can be rejected. 
The remarkable thing about Fama’s paper cannot be seen in the paper 
itself  but in the fact that his critics did  not find any  regression results 
over the entire sample which strongly contradicted his. One would think 
that someone through data dredging could come up with another variable 
which dominated the interest rate as a predictor of  inflation, but that ap- 
pears  not  to be the case. Nelson  and  Schwert  (1977) and Hess  and 
Bicksler (  1975 ) used the highly regarded Box-Jenkins forecasting tech- 
niques to produce a forecast of  future inflation based on lagged inflation 
rates. When Nelson  and Schwert added this forecast to Fama’s regres- 
sion of  inflation on interest rates over the entire sample period (1953-71), 
15. Fama’s inflation rate is computed as At =  (Pt-l -  P,)/P,, so  the food price 
component of  the change applies to the period from the beginning of  the preceding 
month to  the beginning of  the current month. The  interest rate  series gives  the 
treasury bill rate at the end  of  the preceding month, which matures over the cur- 
rent month. 
The monthly change in the food price index is more volatile than other compo- 
nents and had a correlation of  .71 with the monthly change in the consumer price 
index over Fama’s  sample period. Thus, the  led inflation rate may be  the more 
appropriate dependent variable. 148  Robert J. Shiller 
the R2  was increased only to .31 from .29. The coefficient of  the interest 
rate  fell  from  .97  in  Fama’s  regression  to  .65,  and  the  Box-Jenkins 
forecast had a coefficient of  only .38. The coefficient of  the Box-Jenkins 
forecast was significant  (with a t-statistic  of  2.4, in contrast to the t of 
1.6 for the lagged inflation rate alone) and so Nelson  and Schwert con- 
cluded  that  they  had  rejected  Fama’s  hypothesis,  but  they  were  also 
forced to conclude that the interest  rate carried  additional  information 
not  in  the Box-Jenkins  forecast.  Other  critics  were  able to find other 
forecasting variables that pushed up the R2  a little more. Carlson (1977) 
added the employment/population  ratio to Fama’s regression; this vari- 
able was highly significant and boosted the R2  to .36. Still, the coefficient 
of  the interest rate was .64. Joines (1977) added the three lagged values 
of  the wholesalc price index to Fama’s regression, which were also highly 
significant,  boosting  the  R2 another  increment  up to .37,  but  still  the 
coefficient of  the interest rate remained at .77. 
We thus concur with Fama that his results and the results of  his critics 
do suggest that most of  the variation in nominal short rates in his sample 
period can be attributed to inflationary expectations. Fama’s results must 
give pause to those who believe that inflationary expectations are highly 
sluggish or follow a trend and that medium-run movements in short-term 
interest rates are movements in ex ante real rates. 
It is possible to get an estimate of  the variance of  the ex ante real in- 
terest rate from Fama’s regression of  inflation on interest if  one is willing 
to assume that the real rate of  interest is uncorrelated  with the predicted 
inflation  rate. It is easy to see this as an application  of  the well-known 
theorem which states that, in a simple regression, if  there is a measure- 
ment error in the independent  variable, the probability limit of  the esti- 
mated  coefficient is biased  downward by  a factor which  is the ratio of 
the  variance  of  the true  independent  variable  to the  variance  of  the 
measured independent  variable.  Here, we take the variation  in the real 
interest rate as the “measurement  error.”  If  we  ascribe all of  the devi- 
ation  of  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the  interest  rate  from  l  to this 
source, then  this implies  that  with an estimated  coefficient  of  .98, the 
variance of  the real rate is only about 2% of  the variance of  the observed 
interest  rate, which  implies  that the standard  deviation  of  the real rate 
is about 20 basis points. Nelson and Schwert used this kind of  argument 
to arrive at an estimate of  the variance of  the real  rate of  interest, but 
they based  their estimate on a different regression:  of  the change in the 
rate of  inflation on the difference between the interest rate and the lagged 
inflation rate which produced  a smaller coefficient (equal to 39).  Under 
Fama’s hypothesis, the coefficient should again be 1. If  we take the real 
rate of  interest again as the “measurement error” of  a true independent 
variable which is the inflation forecast  minus the lagged actual inflation 
rate and  if  we assume that  the measurement  error is uncorrelated  with 149  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
the true independent variable, then by the same reasoning we come up 
with  an estimate of  the  variance  of  the  real  rate  of  interest which  is 
1 -  .89 =  .11 times the variance of  the interest  rate minus the lagged 
inflation rate, which then implies a standard deviation for the real rate 
of 80 basis points. 
These estimates of the variance are suggestive, although they must have 
substantial sampling error (not discussed by  Nelson and Schwert). They 
do suggest smaller movements  in  real  interest rates than  many people 
expected to see. 
Time Series Analysis of  Real Rate and Money Stock Data 
From the sound of  the hypotheses, it would appear that a Granger or 
Sims test of  causality  (see Sims 1978) from money to real interest rates 
and a test of  the effects of  anticipated versus unanticipated money on real 
rates along lines suggested by Barro  (1978), would be relevant to their 
evaluation. 
Granger and Sims tests of  causality from the change in the log of  the 
money stock to ex post real interest rates as shown in figure 4.4 appear 
in table 4.2. Seasonality was handled in two ways. In some regressions, a 
seasonal dummy was added to the regression. For other regressions the 
data were first Fourier transformed, both real and imaginary parts were 
then set to zero in a band of  width ~/l2  around the seasonal frequency 
and the series were then inverse Fourier  transformed to produce a de- 
seasonalized series. Data for the Sims tests was also quasi-first differenced 
with filter  (1 -  .75~5)~. 
The results  of  these  causality  tests are that, for the postwar period, 
money unambiguously causes real rates. Clearly the stochastic structure 
of  the series has changed since the Accord,  since no causality is found 
for the pre-Accord period. 
Barro tests  reported in table 4.3 use data series DM (change in the 
log money stock), DMR (Barro’s estimate of  the public’s forecast error 
at time t for the change in  the log money stock at time t),  and G/y  (real 
government  expenditure  over real  GNP) from Barro  (1978,  tables  1 
and 2). The dependent variable is the one-year  (annual average) trea- 
sury bill rate or the rate on the treasury bill whose maturity is closest to 
one year minus the lead one-year  inflation rate DP from Barro (1978, 
table  2). Neither  the  DM nor the DMR terms are significant in these 
regressions, which seems odd, since the Granger and Sims tests found, 
with  different  data,  that  money  causes  real  rates.  The F  statistic  is, 
however, nearly  significant at the  10% level in the last  regression. An 
interesting observation that arises here is that in the regression in which 
DM is  excluded, all variables have the sign we would expect. All DMR 
terms have negative coefficients and G/y  has a positive coefficient. 150  Robert J. Shiller 
Table 4.2  Granger-Sims Causality Tests 
Seasonal 


























































Tests  indicate  whether  the  change in the  log of  the  money  supply  (from time 
series illustrated in fig. 4.3)  causes real rates  (from series shown in  fig. 4.4).  Data 
is seasonally adjusted unless seasonal dummy appears. For Sims tests, data is quasi 
first differenced with filter  (1 -  .75L)2. Ex post real  rate based  on nominal rate 
in a given quarter is considered contemporaneous with the change in the log of  the 
money stock from the preceding quarter to the given quarter. Granger tests involve 
regressing real  rate  on five lagged values of  the  real  rate and  money  variable,  a 
constant, a linear time trend and, if  noted, a seasonal dummy. F statistic is test of 
hypothesis that all lagged money coefficients are zero. Sims tests involve regressing 
the money variable on 4 lead, a contemporaneous and 6 lagged real rate variables, 
as well as a constant and linear time trend. F  statistic is test of  the hypothesis that 
all lead real rate coefficients are zero. 
*Significant at 5% level. 
**Significant at 1% level. 
What do these results mean? One interpretation along lines suggested 
by the literature on rational expectations and the natural rate of  unem- 
ployment hypotheses follows from the assumption of  a structural relation 
implying that real interest rates respond linearly to the change in the log 
money stock and expectations of  future changes in log money stocks: Table 4.3  Earro Type Regressions 
~~  ~  ~ 
Coefficient of 
Const  DMR  DMR-,  DMR-,  DMR-,  DM  DM-,  DM-,  DM-,  Time  C/y  R2  D.W.  S.E. F  F, 
.372  -23.8  -7.15  -17.0  -29.3  -  -  -  -  .023 - 
(.627)  (-1.22)  (-.371)  (-.900)  (-1.55)  -  -  -  -  (.582) -  .218  1.46  1.28  1.06 - 
-7.64  -27.0  -9.45  -31.7  -38.2  -  -  -  -  .191  46.9 
(2.12*)  (2.04)  .366  1.82  1.18  1.73 -  (-1.93)  (-1.48)  (-.52)  (-1.68)  (-2.13*)  -  -  -  - 
.251 - 
.550  1.82  1.10 2.03  2.75 
*353  34‘4  .594  2.04  1.08  2.04  1.96 
2.93  11.4  87.7  -30.2  68.5  -39.8  -75.4  36.9  -96.0 
(2.53*)  (.192)  (1.40)  (-0.50)  (1.87)  (-.74)  (-l.2Oj  (372) (-2.30*)  (2.87*) - 
-2.95  17.6  85.0  -42.2  55.2  -52.4  -74.9  46.2  -79.1 
(-0.60)  (.300)  (1.38)  (-.694)  (1.46)  (-.971)  (-1.22)  (.723)  (-1.83)  (2.96*)  (1.23) 
NOTES 
Dependent variable is the annual average monthly one-year trea- 
sury bill rate series (or 9-12-month  rate series when  12-month rate 
is  unavailable)  from  Banking  and  Monetary  Statisiics  1941-70, 
Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, 1976, and Fed- 
era1 Reserve Bullefin) minus 100 times Barro’s 1978 inflation vari- 
able  (DP) for the following year. All  other data are from Barro 
1978. DM is the change  in  the  log  of  the money  stock, DMR is 
the residual  in Barro’s DM forecasting equation,  G/y  is  real  gov- 
ernment expenditure over real GNP. Time is  1 in  1952 and 25 in 
1976. Sample period is 1952-76.  F, is F statistic to test hypothesis 
that coefficients of  all DM terms  are zero.  The t  statistics  are in 
parentheses. 
*.Significant at 5% level. 152  Robert J. Shiller 
where pt is the rationally expected real interest rate, mt is the log money 
stock,  St  is a  stochastic process  representing the real forces that cause 
movements in the real  rate  even when the money  stock is predictably 
growing along a constant  growth path, +&  and  t,bij  are coefficients, and 
EtPi denotes  expectation  conditional  on information  available  at time 
t -  i. 
The ex  post  real  rate rt -  pt+l +  pt equals  the rationally expected 
real interest rate plus an error term: rt -  pt+l +  pt =  pt +  qt+l,  where 
the error term is uncorrelated with all data known at time t and hence is 
itself  serially  uncorrelated  but  may  be  correlated  with  information 
acquired between t and t +  1. 
In terms of  this formulation, hypothesis 1 may be interpreted to mean 
that +i  and +ij  are all zero, so that Pt =  Ct and rt -  pt+l +  pt =  St +  qt. 
We shall assume for the moment that it  is constant. Then, Fama’s tests 
are appropriate and Barro’s tests should find all DM and DMR terms in- 
significant (as we  in fact found) although a DMRt+l term may be sig- 
nificant insofar  as  it  affects vt+l.  Granger or  Sims tests  should  show 
that money does not cause real rates, since, as Fama noted, ex post real 
rates will be unforecastable white noise. 
Hypothesis 2 may be interpreted as a restriction on the coefficients of 
(14), namely: 
n 
pt =  St + 8 ai(Amt-i -  Et-i(Amt-d 1, 
i=O 
(14’) 
so that only surprises in monetary policy Amt -  EtAmt affect real rates. 
The lagged terms are included to allow for persistence in the effects of 
these surprises. Now, Fama’s tests are no longer appropriate even if  St 
is constant. The Barro type tests should show all DM terms insignificant, 
but the DMR terms, which are supposed to represent Amt -  Et(  Amt), 
might now be  significant. Since  Pt is a simple moving average process 
whose innovation  mt -  Etmt is uncorrelated  with past data, a Sims or 
Granger test using the true  Pt  would show that money does not cause 
pt, that is, ptP1, pt-2, . . .  contain all information available for forecasting 
pt and hence further information in terms of  lagged m is of  no value. 
Hypothesis  3  might be interpreted as a  less  stringent  restriction  on 
(14) : 
(  14”) 
n 
S=O 
pt =  St + 2  ao,i(Amt-i -  Et-i(Amt-c)) 
+ 8 adAmt-i -  Et-i.-l  (Amt-$> 
n 
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where s is the policy effectiveness interval.  The restriction  imposed by 
this  hypothesis  is  that  long-term  forecast  errors  (i.e.,  for  a  forecast 
horizon greater than s)  have in themselves no effect on p. This hypothe- 
sis now implies nothing  for  any  of  the tests  we  have  examined.  One 
might  have  thought that  it would  perhaps  imply that, with  a  Granger 
causality test, money terms lagged more than s periods would have no 
effect, but  this  is  not the case.  The only  test that  seems immediately 
suggested by it would be  an extension of  the Barro test found by esti- 
mating a battery of 0-period,  1-period, 2-period, and so on, forecasting 
equations,  and  then  taking  their  residuals  as  estimates  of  the  terms 
Am, -  Et  (  Am,),  Amt --  Et-  (  Amt),  and so on. One could then estimate 
(14")  using for p  the ex post real interest rate. Hypothesis 3 would then 
imply that coefficients of  Amt -  Et-j(Amt),  j  > s should be zero, which 
is in principle testable. 
While  the  above  analysis  seems  to  suggest that  Granger,  Sims, or 
Barro tests,  or extensions thereof, might well be used  to examine the 
hypotheses,  it is useful to bear in mind the stringent  assumptions that 
must be made. These assumptions have for the most part already been 
pointed  out in different contexts by,  for example,  Sargent (1976)  and 
Sims (  1977), so we will cite them only briefly here. 
We have assumed first that tt  is constant. In fact, it is plausible that 
real  factors  have  had  an impact  on  real  interest  rates  and  that  the 
forecast of  Ct may be related  to lagged money.  For example, wartime 
increases in  government  expenditure may  themselves  influence {t and 
are also correlated  with  the wartime  increases  in money.  On the one 
hand, this may mean that Barro, Granger, or Sims tests would find that 
money  has  an  effect on  real  rates  even  if  hypothesis  1 or 2 is  true. 
Barro's  contemporaneous G/y term  may  well  fail to correct for such 
effects. On the other hand, even if  all the hypotheses are false, it is possi- 
ble, as Sims (1977) has pointed  out in a more general context, that if 
the Fed has been trying to stabilize real interest rates, that is, offset tt, 
causality tests might lead one to conclude that money has no effect on 
real interest rates.  These problems seriously limit the usefulness of  the 
above tests for the purpose of  examining our hypotheses. 
Another problem with the Granger or Sims tests in this context is that 
our hypotheses relate to unobservable rationally expected real rates and 
we  use in  the tests the ex post  real  rates.  With either  the Granger or 
Sims tests the real rate must appear on the right-hand  side of  the equa- 
tion, so we have an errors in variables problem (which is not completely 
solved by using some other estimate of  the rationally expected real rates). 
Then, even if hypothesis 2 is true, m may appear to cause real rates, since 
lagged Am  may provide information  about Amt-% -  Et-iAmt-i not ob- 
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This problem would not arise if  we were willing to assume in hypothe- 
sis 2 that there is no persistence in the effects of  monetary  surprises on 
real interest rates, that is,  ai  =  0, i 2 1. Then (so long as problems of 
time variation in ct do not arise) we could test the hypothesis by checking 
whether  ex post real rates can be forecasted.  In effect, we could elimi- 
nate the lagged real rate terms from the Granger test by theoretical con- 
siderations. Similarly, if  the summations in  (1  4”)  are known to contain 
only the first term  (i.e., aji =  0, i 2  1, all j)  then hypothesis 3 could be 
tested  merely  by regressing  ex post  real rates  on information  known  s 
periods  earlier,  which  should  not contribute to a forecast of  real rates. 
However, those who have suggested our hypotheses have made it clear 
that they are not willing to rule out persistence, so these tests cannot be 
used. 
Another problem with the Barro tests is that it is perhaps not possible 
to identify  the contemporaneous forecast errors, since these rely neces- 
sarily  on  an arbitrary  characterization  of  the forecasting  relation  and 
information  set of  the public. His forecasting  equation depends on one 
contemporaneous variable  (a government expenditure  term) which ap- 
pears no more likely to be known at any point of  time than is the money 
stock itself. This term is essential to the model, since without it his fore- 
casting relation  would be autoregressive, in which  case the DM terms 
would be linear combinations  of  lagged DMR terms and hence not dis- 
tinguishable in the regression. 
Finally, whatever we  learn about  (14) under one policy rule, we do 
not necessarily know that  (14) is a structural relation which is invariant 
under alternative policy rules, as Sargent ( 1976) has emphasized. 
Conclusion 
We will conclude here by  listing the salient facts that seem relevant 
to each of the three hypotheses. Since the hypotheses are nested, evidence 
against any hypothesis also serves as evidence against the hypotheses pre- 
ceding it. 
Hypothesis I.  The Federal Open Market Committee knows it can in- 
fluence  nominal  rates  because  it  has  conducted  what  Friedman  and 
Schwartz  (  1963) called “quasi-controlled  experiments”; that  is,  it has 
moved the money stock in ways and at times that could not be ascribed 
to reverse causality from economic variables to the money stock. It seems 
highly improbable that the outcome could be explained in terms of  the 
reaction  of  inflationary  expectations  to the shock. We thus feel we can 
safely say that hypothesis  one is wrong. 
Fama’s  evidence  serves  principally  to cast  substantial doubt on the 
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must be due primarily  to movements  in  ex  ante real rates since infla- 
tionary  expectations  are  very  sluggish. The correspondence  of  move- 
ments in post-Accord  nominal rates and the optimally forecasted infla- 
tion rates is fairly impressive. One must bear in mind that really short- 
run  movements  in  nominal  rates  did not  occur  enough  in  the  sample 
period for us to say anything about these movements in nominal interest 
rates.  Fama probably  exaggerates  the problems  with  earlier  data and 
our results with these incline us to the conclusion that the relative con- 
stancy of  real rates in his sample is due to Fed behavior, not the inability 
of  the Fed to shock them. An interesting unanswered  question is:  Why 
did the Fed behave so as to keep the pretax real rate constant? Was this 
behavior  due to their concern with some other variable which responds 
reliably to this rate? 
Hypothesis 2. Direct evidence against this weaker  hypothesis can be 
found only if  we can find policy rule changes which affect the predictable 
component  of  monetary  policy.  Barro  claims  to  have  decomposed 
changes  in  the money stock into predicted versus unpredicted  compo- 
nents for the postwar period, but his claim is not terribly convincing and 
in any event he assumed a constant policy rule. Granger or Sims causality 
tests  are suitable as tests  of  this hypothesis  only under  some artificial 
assumptions. 
One policy change that appears to relate to the way the Fed reacts to 
public information is marked by the Accord in 1951. This change was a 
once-and-for-all  change ascribable largely to factors whose origin lay in 
politics and theoretical economics, and in this sense it too was exogenous. 
There is  a  dramatic change in  the  behavior  of  real  interest  rates that 
seems, looking at the data, to coincide with the Accord. Unfortunately, 
we  do not  know for  sure that this  change  is  due to a  change in the 
systematic policy rule or just  a change in the magnitude of  the random 
components. It is also possible, moreover, that other changing variables 
were responsible for the change in the real rate’s behavior. We also saw, 
for example, a dramatic rise in income tax rates dating from World War 
11,  and although this change does not  coincide with the change in real 
rate behavior,  one  could  not  rule  out that the two  are related.  Para- 
doxically, pretax real interest rates were more stable after the tax rates 
were increased, when the theoretical case for constant pretax real rates 
was apparently weakened. 
Hypothesis 3. Direct evidence against this yet weaker hypothesis can 
be found  only if  we  can discover  changes in  the monetary policy rule 
which relate to information known in  advance for a length of  time ex- 
ceeding the policy effectiveness internal. We considered one such shock 
to  policy  which  relates to information  forecastable  into the indefinite 
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announced a policy of  reducing the seasonal shock in nominal rates. The 
Fed succeeded  in reducing it, but there is no evidence that it affected 
the seasonal factor in real rates. 
The most important potential source of  evidence against this hypothe- 
sis, as well as hypothesis 2, comes not from the macroeconomic data but 
from other considerations. If  we  combine hypothesis  3 with  a demand 
for money  equation  and  a stability  condition,  then  we  are led  to the 
conclusion that the price  level bears a certain relationship to informa- 
tion  about monetary policy known  in  advance by more than the policy 
effectiveness  interval.  While  it  is  plausible  that  in  some  alternative 
steady states  characterized  by,  say, different money  growth rates,  this 
might work out to be true, it does not seem likely that new information 
about discrete Fed policy actions would become optimally incorporated 
in the price level over any policy effectiveness interval.  Most prices do 
not seem to be set that way. 
We  conclude that none of  the hypotheses is  likely to be so strictly 
correct as to rule out completely a predictable effect of  systematic mone- 
tary policy on expected real interest rates. This does not by itself establish 
that there is a role for monetary policy in improving economic welfare. 
This conclusion, moreover, rests on our impression of  how prices are set 
and not  on any formal statistical evidence, which cannot be effectively 
brought to bear either for or against our conclusion. We hope, however, 
to have  clarified why  the complete noncontrollability of  expected real 
interest rates should not be, as many seem to have concluded recently, 
a cornerstone for macroeconomic modelling. 
Comment  Phillip Cagan 
Economists have long assigned to monetary changes an effect on the real 
rate of  interest. In a famous passage Ricardo stated that changes in the 
money stock would not affect interest rates in the long run, because price 
increases would take the economy to the same equilibrium in real terms 
that it started from.I6 I  interpret  the word  “permanently”  in Ricardo’s 
statement to mean that monetary increases temporarily depress interest 
rates (both real and nominal-though  such a distinction was not typically 
16.  “The interest for money is not regulated by the  rate at which  the  [central] 
Bank will lend, whether it be 5, 4, or 3 per cent; but by the rate of  profits, which 
can be made by the employment of  capital, and which is totally independent of  the 
quantity, or of  the value of  money. Whether a bank lent one million, ten millions, 
or a hundred millions, they would not permanently alter the market rate of  inter- 
est; they would alter only the value of the money which they thus issued’’ (Ricardo 
1817, Everyman’s Edition, p. 246; italics added). 157  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
made in  the classical  literature).  Mill  alludes  to  an  effect which  was 
apparently widely accepted at the time and was later elaborated and made 
famous by Wicksell (1898, 1906) as an effect of  “cumulative inflation.”17 
Wicksell considered a continual increase in the money stock through bank 
expansion  (either by  a falling reserve ratio or growth of  the monetary 
base). Since the new money enters the economy through credit markets 
and is assumed initially to  augment the supply of  loanable funds, the 
real rate of  interest is reduced. Although the inflation that ensues reduces 
the purchasing power of  all money, the inflow of  new money continues 
to command resources and can be viewed as a continual addition to bank 
loans  in  real  terms.  Unlike  Ricardo’s  proposition,  the Wicksell  effect 
does not pass away but holds the real rate of  interest lower so long as 
the money supply increases. The Wicksell effect involves a redistribution 
of  spending in the economy; most recent models of  the economy  and 
Shiller’s review of  them put aside distributional effects of money creation 
and so neglect this effect. 
Recent contributians to monetary theory clarify the assumptions un- 
derlying these earlier propositions. If  we  assume, contrary to the classi- 
cal economists, that prices are perfectly flexible and expectations are ra- 
tional,  Ricardo’s long-run  equilibrium  is achieved very rapidly  and, in 
so far as changes in the money stock are anticipated, immediately. Hence, 
in some recent models, as Shiller explains, changes in prices nullify the 
potential  real  effects of  monetary  changes,  and the short-run  changes 
implied by  Ricardo’s statement cited above never occur. 
Price flexibility and rational expectations do not dispose of  the Wick- 
sell effect, however, since its redistributional  effect is not eliminated in 
real terms by price increases. In an earlier work I analyzed the Wicksell 
effect as a situation  in which all the revenue from money creation was 
used by the issuers to increase their saving to acquire more assets (Cagan 
1972). Such a lopsided disposition of  the income from money creation 
is questionable and  not the most plausible  assumption. If  bank owners 
treat such income as they do all other income, I showed that the Wicksell 
effect disappears. It can sneak back in, however, if  bank owners save a 
high proportion of  income from money creation because it is unantici- 
pated or uncertain or if  the Federal Reserve deliberately uses its revenue 
from money creation to retire the national debt. We can still cut off  this 
last  effect if,  as suggested by  Ricardo  (1817) and Barro (1974), we 
treat the public as knowledgeable stockholders of  the government  and 
17.  “The paper currency in common use, being a currency provided by bankers, 
is all issued in the way of loans, except the part employed in the purchase of  gold 
and silver. The same operation, therefore, which adds to the currency also adds to 
the loans: the whole increase of  currency in the first instance swells the loan mar- 
ket.  Considered as  an  addition to  loans  it  tends  to  lower  interest”  (Mill  1865, 
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assume that individuals privately offset whatever saving the Federal Re- 
serve does on their behalf. 
To the question, Can the Fed  control real  interest rates?  a broadly 
accepted  answer  in  the profession  even  today  would  be  that,  for the 
short-run impact, yes; but  that  over time  the effect diminishes to zero 
(ignoring second-order effects on the capital stock); and the more mone- 
tary actions are anticipated and adjusted to, the smaller the effect, while 
in some cases perhaps these adjustments make it zero in the short run. 
(This  says  nothing  about  the  desirability  of  having  the  Fed  use  this 
capability. ) 
Shiller appears to share this  general view. But  he  asks  an auxiliary 
question, What solid evidence do we really have that the Fed affects real 
rates? Given the difficulties of  testing rational expectations and whether 
policy actions are anticipated, the evidence must be examined with con- 
siderable sophistication. This Shiller does, and his paper is very good from 
this point of  view. The counterpart to being sophisticated is that straight- 
forward statistical evidence is slim, and in that respect  his paper makes 
only a limited case for the affirmative view that the Fed affects real rates. 
Yet Shiller analyzes some qualitative empirical evidence that is of  special 
interest  in  answering  the  question  even  if  it  does  not  resolve  all  the 
issues raised. He looks at some extreme cases most likely to provide evi- 
dence  for  the  affirmative.  These  are  pegging  of  interest  rates  during 
World War I1 and after, the decline in seasonal variation  of  nominal in- 
terest  rates after the founding of  the Federal  Reserve system, and the 
decline in the variance of  monetary growth and real interest rates since 
World War 11.  (As Shiller notes,  the fact  that  nominal  rates adjust  to 
expected inflation does not mean that monetary changes have not pro- 
duced changes in real rates.) 
To use these facts to derive an affirmative answer to the question of 
his paper,  it is  necessary  to  conclude that the  changes in  behavior of 
nominal rates also produced  changes in real rates and that the changes 
reflected a change in Federal Reserve behavior. Shiller has done a better 
job of  persuading me (who needed little) than himself. But he is right to 
be careful, because rigorous statistical evidence on the real rate to sup- 
port the affirmative position is not easy to establish. I am persuaded more 
by  what I know of  those events from historical research  on monetary 
developments . 
Consider the pegging episode, in which the Federal Reserve held nomi- 
nal interest rates at a low level. If  expected  real rates were not also re- 
duced  by  that  action, the  expected  rate  of  change of  prices  had to be 
negative, which meant that expected monetary growth had to be reduced 
appreciably.  It is  difficult to interpret the pegging period as conforming 
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Wicksell scenario, in which the rate of  monetary growth is increased by 
the pegging, prices  rise, and the real rate of  interest  is reduced.  Surely 
most of these changes were widely expected. Indeed, it is difficult to see 
how  the  economy,  given  the  pegging policy,  could  have  avoided  this 
outcome. 
A  similar  interpretation  can be  applied  to the reduction  of  seasonal 
variations  in  nominal  interest  rates,  which the Federal  Reserve  engi- 
neered  and claimed  credit for  (one of  the limited number  of  cases  in 
which its claim to have contributed to the stability of  something appears 
valid, though whether the policy was desirable or not is debatable). Al- 
though Shiller finds that the effect on seasonal variations in real rates of 
interest is unclear, it seems to me that they, too, were probably reduced 
and were expected  to be. The Federal Reserve operated  by  increasing 
monetary growth in the autumn and Christmas season, supplying seasonal 
increases in  currency  and credit in order to hold  down the  traditional 
second-half  rise  in  nominal  rates.  This  certainly facilitated the  corre- 
sponding variation in trade; whether prices  also increased seasonally is 
unclear, but it is likely that they did. If  so, nominal rates rose less in the 
second half  and prices more, or at least not less; hence real rates rose 
less or fell as a result of  the Fed’s policy. 
As possible counter evidence to the affirmative view, Shiller notes that 
the  quarter  century  since World  War  I1  displays  an  increasing corre- 
spondence  between  nominal  interest  rates  and  the  rate  of  change  of 
prices; that is, real rates have risen and fluctuated much less than have 
nominal rates. To be sure, based on the reduced variations in monetary 
growth over  the  same period,  this  suggests that  monetary policy influ- 
enced real  rates. But it  can  also be viewed as evidence that  real rates 
are often independent of  monetary developments. There is disagreement 
in the literature on whether real  rates  can be viewed  as constant over 
this period  and what it would mean if  they have been constant. In any 
event,  I  would  not  take  this  as evidence  against the  affirmative view. 
The statistical relationship between nominal interest rates and the rate of 
inflation pertains mainly to the long-run movement; none of it shows that 
real rates did not fluctuate over the business cycle or that all the fluctu- 
ations were  unrelated  to monetary  developments.  The financial  strin- 
gencies of  1966 and  1969 were  “real”  enough, and the evidence that 
they were engineered by monetary restraint is very persuasive to me. 
I grant that these  stringencies may  have been  largely unanticipated, 
and that our world is changing. As Friedman and Schwartz (1976) note, 
financial markets are learning to conform to the “Fisher effect” (with due 
regard for taxes, of course). 
The duration of  monetary effects on real rates of  interest is therefore a 
crucial consideration. While the long-run  effect never existed or is now 160  Robert J. Shiller 
disappearing, the short-run effect appears strong and, for the present at 
least, long enough to make monetary policy and how it is conducted a 
very serious matter. 
Comment  Charles R. Nelson 
Robert Shiller has undertaken a particularly difficult but correspondingly 
important task in trying to shed some light on the question of  whether the 
Federal Reserve can control real interest rates. Shiller begins by provid- 
ing three specific hypotheses to be considered. Briefly, they are: (1) the 
Fed cannot affect expected real rates at all; (2)  the Fed can affect real 
rates only through surprise moves in policy; and (3) Fed policies known 
far enough in advance will have no effect on expected real rates. To this 
list I would add another hypothesis, which turns out to be surprisingly 
difficult to reject, namely, that there is no variation whatever in expected 
real interest  rates. Shiller’s paper is primarily  concerned with reviewing 
the evidence in favor of  or contrary to these hypotheses including some 
which are relevant to the last hypothesis. 
The essence of  the problem is, of  course, that the ex ante real rate is 
not generally observed. An exception would be the case of  index bonds, 
which are not traded in the U.S. Shiller argues that if  index bonds did 
exist, then the Fed could control their price  and therefore their  (real) 
yield simply by standing ready to buy or sell at a target level. In a world 
of  rational expectations, however, it is not at all clear that the Fed would 
not face a perfectly elastic supply of  such bonds since the implications of 
its actions for the rate of  inflation would be immediately and completely 
understood. Thus, an attempt to depress the yield on index bonds would 
raise both the expected rate of  inflation and nominal discount rates by 
the  same  amount,  making  market  participants  unwilling to hold  any 
index bonds at anything less than the initial equilibrium real yield. 
Shiller also discusses the possibility of  controlling the real rate mea- 
sured with respect to the consensus of  published  inflation forecasts and 
argues  that  the  Fed “can  choose  a  real  interest  rate,  add  to that the 
latest  consensus inflation forecast,  and then  ‘peg’ the  nominal rate at 
their sum.” If  I understand  this  sequence of  events correctly, namely, 
that this real rate is measured relative to a given prior forecast, the abil- 
ity to control it would appear to be of  as little interest as the ability to 
control ex post realized real rates. 
The important question, of  course, is whether  the Fed can affect or 
control real rates measured relative to rationally expected inflation. After 
reviewing the difficulties of  addressing this question in the context of  an 
explicit model, Shiller turns to the possibilities for deriving implied be- 161  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
havior in observable magnitudes, in particular the behavior of the ex post 
realized real rate. For example, Shiller shows that the variance over time 
in the linear forecast of  realized rates based on past realized rates places 
a lower bound on the variance  of  the true rationally  expected ex ante 
real  rate.  Similarly, Fama  (  1975  )  has  argued that autocorrelation  in 
realized rates would constitute evidence of  variation in ex ante real rates 
since the pure forecast error on inflation must be serially random if  ex- 
pectations  are rational. In principle, then, the impact of  changes in the 
regime of  monetary policy on the behavior of  ex ante real rates may have 
observable implications. Unfortunately, as Nelson and Schwert (  1977) 
have demonstrated, the very  large  variance  of  inflation forecast errors 
makes it difficult to reject any plausible hypothesis about the behavior of 
ex ante real rates on the basis of  realized rates of  return. For example, 
Fama was unable to reject the hypothesis that ex ante real rates are con- 
stant. Although Nelson and Schwert were able to reject this extreme null 
hypothesis using more refined tests, the basic problem  of  inferring the 
behavior  of  a  signal  buried  in  substantial  noise  remains.  This  also 
answers the question posed by  Shiller about why Fama’s critics did not 
find some variable that would dominate in an R2  sense the nominal inter- 
est rate as a predictor of  inflation. Similar limitations crop up in Shiller’s 
intriguing examination  of  whether  the Fed altered  the seasonal pattern 
in real rates when it moved soon after its establishment to eliminate the 
seasonal in nominal  interest  rates.  When Shiller applies tests for auto- 
correlation analogous to Fama’s for the period before the Accord, clear 
evidence of  autocorrelation  in  realized rates  and therefore variation in 
ex ante real rates seems to be indicated. But the inflation measure used 
is the wholesale  price  index  and  the well-known shortcomings of  that 
index in reflecting list rather than transaction prices make the presence 
of  autocorrelation in realized returns less convincing evidence of  move- 
ments  in  ex  ante  rates.  Interestingly  enough,  the  empirical  evidence 
would not seem to be nearly so ambiguous in  the case of  real returns 
on  common  stocks. Nelson  (1976)  and others have  presented  strong 
evidence that both  ex post  and ex ante returns  on common stocks are 
negatively related  to inflation. 
Shiller  also discusses the  available  “experimental  evidence”  on the 
ability of  the Fed to influence real rates. Evidently, the Trading Desk can 
in fact drive down nominal short-term  rates  on any given day by buy- 
ing bills.  Since such  an increase in  high-powered money could hardly 
be construed as diminishing expected inflation, the clear implication is 
that the Fed can, at will, drive down the real rate at least temporarily. 
Shiller makes it clear that in a rational expectations context the Fed may 
well  be  able to  engineer  such  movements  in  real  rates  by  surprising 
the market, but that systematic  control is by no means implied by this 
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to unexpected  open market actions by the Fed on short-term rates de- 
signed along the lines of  analogous work by Robert Barro (1977) relat- 
ing to unemployment  and monetary policy have been made by Shiller, 
but of  course are subject to the same statistical problems that have been 
raised by discussants of  Barro’s paper at this conference. 
Comment  James L. Pierce 
Bob Shiller is to be congratulated for having written  yet another highly 
informative and interesting paper. The paper uses the recent literature on 
rational expectations as a basis for examining the  question  of  whether 
or not the Federal Reserve can control rationally expected real interest 
rates. Shiller points out that it is difficult to convert much of  the discus- 
sion about real interest rates into testable hypotheses. His development of 
the various hypotheses and his discussion of  the difficulty in testing them 
is, in itself, a valuable contribution. 
After developing  a  simple model to determine the nominal  interest 
rate and rationally  expected  inflation in which policy,  and the public’s 
response  to  it,  are  endogenous, Shiller  spends  most  of  his  efforts  in 
searching for data that will provide identifying restrictions for the model. 
He has  to find exogenous shocks that  affect the Fed while leaving the 
public  unaffected. The trick  is to find  shifts in  regimes  in  which  the 
stochastic processes driving the system are altered, that is to say, when 
the system moves from one rational expectations equilibrium to another. 
Ordinary  time-series  analysis  is  not  useful for  the  task.  Shiller shows 
considerable skill and tenacity in looking for appropriate episodes. For 
example, he looks for changes in the seasonality of  interest rates follow- 
ing the founding of  the Federal Reserve system and for changes in the 
stochastic behavior of  “real” interest rates following the Accord of  195  1, 
when the Fed abandoned  its peg on government security prices. 
Despite his many efforts, Shiller is unable to provide unambiguous evi- 
dence on the question of  whether the Fed can control real interest rates 
because the very shifts in regimes that could  allow identification of  pa- 
rameters might have affected other parameters in the system. But he does 
find some evidence to support the proposition that the Fed can affect  real 
interest rates. 
It  is  possible  that more  evidence  could  be  brought  to bear  on  the 
issues if  additional structure wcre introduced. The real interest rates that 
Shiller considers are real in Fisher’s sense, that is, the real interest rate 
is taken to be the nominal interest rate less the expectcd rate of  inflation. 
The Fisher approach is then applied to financial assets. But there is also 
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rates are always equal, but one would expect agents to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities between them. These opportunities drive the kind of model 
developed by Wicksell. 
There is substantial evidence that some combination of Fed policy and 
inflationary shocks can drive a wedge between the real return on finan- 
cial assets and that on real assets. For example, the real return on short- 
term financial assets has been negative for much of  the period from 1974 
to the present, yet many real assets such as commodity inventories and 
houses have enjoyed a substantial real return. Apparently, asset markets 
are more specialized and segmented than many observers have thought. 
It is difficult to remove by arbitrage differences in  real return between 
treasury bills and houses.  When wide margins do exist between the re- 
turn on financial assets and that on real assets, such episodes can pro- 
vide  additional identifying  restrictions for tests  of  relevant  hypotheses 
concerning the Fed’s  ability to influence real  interest  rates.  It is con- 
ceivable  that this  ability  is considerably  greater  for  financial  than  for 
real assets. 
Comment  Martin Feldstein 
The basic economic decisions to save and invest do not depend on the 
real  interest rate  as such but  on the  net-of-tax real  interest rate.  The 
relevant question  about the neutrality of  monetary policy should there- 
fore be restated  as, “Can the Fed Control the Real Net Interest Rate?” I 
think that there can be little doubt that this is so. 
It is important to note first that if  the real interest rate remains un- 
changed, the real net rate will be significantly altered. This occurs because 
the tax rate applies to the nominal interest rate, making the effective tax 
rate a function of  the rate of  inflation. Consider, for example, an individ- 
ual with a 50% marginal tax rate. If  the interest rate is 4% and there is no 
inflation, the real rate is obviously 4%  and the real net rate is 2%.  If 
a 6% inflation rate keeps the real rate unchanged, the nominal rate be- 
comes  10%; the net-of-tax  nominal rate is 5%  and the net real rate is 
-1  % . So even if  monetary policy is neutral in the sense that the 4% 
real interest rate is unchanged, the 6% rate of  inflation can turn a 2% 
real net yield into a real net yield of -  1  % . Of  course, for a borrower 
with a 50% marginal tax rate, the 6%  inflation also causes a correspond- 
ing reduction in the real net cost of  borrowing. 
The assumption of  a fixed real pretax interest rate also represents an 
extreme and unlikely case. In several papers, I have examined the theo- 
retical and empirical aspects of  the effect of  inflation on the interest rate 
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product of  capital remained constant  (Feldstein  1976, Feldstein, Green, 
and Sheshinski 1978, Feldstein and Summers 1978a). This analysis sug- 
gests that, with current tax rates and depreciation rules, each 1% of  in- 
flation raises the interest rate that firms would be willing to pay by some- 
what more than  1%.  The net effect of  inflation depends also on the way 
in which tax rules affect the supply of  funds and the demand for funds in 
other markets. Because of  differences in tax rules, it is clear that inflation 
will not affect investment in housing in the same way it affects investment 
in industrial plant and equipment. 
These results have important implications about the interpretation of 
the existing evidence on the “neutrality”  of  monetary policy. Evidence 
that each 1 % of  expected inflation raises the interest rate by 1  % has in- 
correctly been  viewed  as implying such neutrality. Just the opposite is 
true.  A  demonstration  that the  real  interest  rate remains  unchanged 
should be interpreted  as evidence of  nonneutrality because it implies a 
change in the real net rate of  interest. 
A sustained increase in  the rate of  growth  of  money thus alters the 
real  net interest rates that govern individual decisions. The complexity 
and distortions introduced  in  this  way  should be regarded  as a major 
reason for opposing such inflation. 
General Discussion 
Shiller  was  asked  whether  under  the  hypotheses  he was  testing,  the 
nominal interest rate should not have fallen by 500 basis points in 1971 
when Phase I of  wage-price controls reduced the inflation rate by 5%. 
He replied that only the first hypothesis carries this implication; he did 
not doubt that hypothesis  1 could be rejected.  In connection with Nel- 
son’s proposed  hypothesis  that the real rate is constant, he noted  that 
the Fama results could be rejected for periods other than  1951-73;  he 
had to reject the hypothesis with a sample extended to 1977 for instance. 
In response to a criticism that the paper was overly skeptical Shiller 
argued that he had clearly rejected hypothesis  1. While prima facie evi- 
dence against hypotheses 2 and 3 could not be found, it seemed unlikely 
that either was strictly true. He found it implausible that the aggregate 
price level should optimally incorporate information about future mone- 
tary policy, as these hypotheses imply. Shiller said that he had concen- 
trated  on short rather than  long rates in  this study, but that his work 
with Siege1 on British consol yields over 250 years found that long-term 
real yields showed large movements. Movements in  nominal long-term 
yields worked in the direction of  increasing the amplitude of  the move- 
ment in real long-term yields. 165  Can the Fed Control Real Interest Rates? 
Robert Hall suggested that the paper was missing an analysis of  the 
economic forces that might  stabilize the real  interest rate. Arbitrage is 
the potential  link  between  the behavior  of  nominal  interest  rates  and 
prices. The consumer price index is not representative of  the goods sub- 
ject to arbitrage over time, since it includes perishables. 
It was suggested that arbitrage could not account for the behavior of 
interest rates during 1975 and 1976, since ex ante real treasury bill rates 
then were clearly negative. Paul Samuelson replied that arbitrage possi- 
bilities of  the type discussed by Hall did not necessarily rule out non- 
negativity of  real interest rates.  If  there  were  commodities storable at 
zero  cost,  then  the  real  rate,  at  least  as  measured  in terms  of  those 
goods, could not become negative. In the absence of  such commodities, 
the real rate could indeed be negative. 
Herschel  Grossman  argued that the fact that money supply data are 
revised several times tends to support the view that confusion about the 
level of  the money stock contributes to the business cycle. He was not 
confident that  existing theories  based  on incomplete  information  were 
enough to explain business cycles, but also doubted that existing theories 
based on nonclearing of  markets could provide the full explanation. 
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